An auction mechanism for polynomial-time execution with combinatorial constraints

A. Andersson, J.-A. Holmstrom, Mattias Willman
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the fact that even if we ignore the computational hardness of winner determination, a combinatorial auction is in many situations unlikely to produce the most efficient allocation. This is because each bidder has an exponential number of combinations to bid on, and basically only her own valuations as help when selecting combinations. This paper is based on the conjecture that for a large class of auction instances, given a reasonable restriction on the input each bidder can provide, there exists an auction mechanism where the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time, at the same time as the expected result is more efficient than that of a conventional combinatorial auction. The evidence is given by explicitly describing such an auction mechanism, and by simulation results.
组合约束下多项式时间执行的拍卖机制
在本文中,我们关注这样一个事实,即即使我们忽略赢家确定的计算难度,组合拍卖在许多情况下也不可能产生最有效的分配。这是因为每个竞标者都有指数数量的组合来竞标,基本上只有她自己的估价才能在选择组合时有所帮助。本文基于这样的假设:对于一大类拍卖实例,在给定每个竞标者可提供的输入的合理限制下,存在一种可以在多项式时间内解决中标者确定问题的拍卖机制,同时预期结果比传统的组合拍卖更有效。证据是通过明确描述这种拍卖机制和模拟结果给出的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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