{"title":"Reviewing the Speaker's Decision: A Brief Synopsis of UDM v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 (CC)","authors":"B. Slade","doi":"10.17159/1727-3781/2021/V24I0A8111","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 (CC), the Constitutional Court set out certain factors that the Speaker of the National Assembly must consider when deciding the manner in which voting in a motion of no confidence proceeding must be conducted. These factors would ostensibly also be relevant when the Speaker's decision as to the proper voting procedure is reviewed in future. This note considers the law governing the review of the Speaker's decisions and finds that although the Speaker's decision is reviewable in South African law, after the UDM decision there is still uncertainty as to whether the Speaker's decision can be reviewed only on the basis of legality or whether it constitutes administrative action reviewable in terms of PAJA. Furthermore, the Court's exposition of certain factors against which the Speaker's decision can now be reviewed creates uncertainty as to whether the review in terms of legality is a basic rationality review as is generally the case or a stricter form of review closer to review that is possible under PAJA. The argument is that the potential of reviewing the Speaker's decision on the basis of a number of factors that in totality appears to set out a test that is stricter than a basic rationality test may hold severe implications for the separation of powers doctrine, as it now appears that the Court is increasing its supervisory jurisdiction in a manner that is not fully substantiated. Although the Court, or courts in general, has the power to review the exercise of public power in a system of constitutional supremacy, it should consider the impact that its judgments may have on co-equal branches of government, as a failure to do so may negatively impact on the relationship between the different branches of government and dilute the already frayed separation of powers doctrine.","PeriodicalId":120850,"journal":{"name":"African Law eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"African Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2021/V24I0A8111","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 (CC), the Constitutional Court set out certain factors that the Speaker of the National Assembly must consider when deciding the manner in which voting in a motion of no confidence proceeding must be conducted. These factors would ostensibly also be relevant when the Speaker's decision as to the proper voting procedure is reviewed in future. This note considers the law governing the review of the Speaker's decisions and finds that although the Speaker's decision is reviewable in South African law, after the UDM decision there is still uncertainty as to whether the Speaker's decision can be reviewed only on the basis of legality or whether it constitutes administrative action reviewable in terms of PAJA. Furthermore, the Court's exposition of certain factors against which the Speaker's decision can now be reviewed creates uncertainty as to whether the review in terms of legality is a basic rationality review as is generally the case or a stricter form of review closer to review that is possible under PAJA. The argument is that the potential of reviewing the Speaker's decision on the basis of a number of factors that in totality appears to set out a test that is stricter than a basic rationality test may hold severe implications for the separation of powers doctrine, as it now appears that the Court is increasing its supervisory jurisdiction in a manner that is not fully substantiated. Although the Court, or courts in general, has the power to review the exercise of public power in a system of constitutional supremacy, it should consider the impact that its judgments may have on co-equal branches of government, as a failure to do so may negatively impact on the relationship between the different branches of government and dilute the already frayed separation of powers doctrine.
在“统一民主运动诉国会议长2017年5 SA 300 (CC)”一案中,宪法法院列出了国会议长在决定对不信任动议进行投票的方式时必须考虑的某些因素。这些因素在将来审查议长关于适当投票程序的决定时,表面上也是相关的。本说明审议了关于审查议长决定的法律,并认为,尽管根据南非法律,议长的决定是可以审查的,但在UDM决定之后,议长的决定是否只能根据合法性进行审查,或者它是否构成根据PAJA可审查的行政行为,仍然存在不确定性。此外,法院对某些因素的阐述现在可以对议长的决定进行审查,这造成了不确定性,即在合法性方面的审查是一般情况下的基本合理性审查,还是更严格的审查形式,更接近PAJA下可能的审查。论点是,根据一些因素来审查议长的决定的可能性,总的来说,这些因素似乎设定了一种比基本合理性测试更严格的测试,这可能对三权分立原则产生严重影响,因为现在看来,法院正在以一种没有充分证实的方式增加其监督管辖权。虽然最高法院或一般法院有权在宪法至上的制度下审查公共权力的行使,但它应该考虑其判决可能对共同平等的政府部门产生的影响,因为不这样做可能会对不同政府部门之间的关系产生负面影响,并削弱已经磨损的三权分立原则。