Democracy Sanctions an Assessment of Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion

Abstract

Democracy promotion is often dismissed as a futile American foreign policy endeavor. Economic sanctions conventionally are derided as ineffective and counterproductive. Consequently, one might predict that the use of economic sanctions to promote democracy would represent a hopelessly inept strategy. This study finds, conversely, that sanctions represent a relatively effective instrument of democracy promotion. The idea that sanctions were futile was minted in the bipolar era, when the structural attributes of the international system limited the effectiveness of superpower sanctions. After the marked shift in the polar configuration of power upon the disappearance of the Soviet Union, however, the structural attributes of the system presented a more benign environment for the sanctions efforts of the United States. A comparative analysis of the use of democracy sanctions in the bipolar era versus those implemented in the 1990s reveals that sanctions became significantly more effective. This essay examines the causal origins of the increase in the effectiveness of democracy sanctions, and considers whether the high success rate for the approach can be sustained into the near future in light of recent challenges to American hegemony.