Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm

S. Brams, D. Kilgour, Christian Klamler
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引用次数: 41

Abstract

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in which any item named by both players in the same round goes into a “contested pile", AL may reduce, or even eliminate the contested pile, allocating additional or more preferred items to the players. The allocation(s) that AL yields are Pareto-optimal, envy-free, and maximal; as the number of items (assumed even) increases, the probability that AL allocates all the items appears to approach infinity if all possible rankings are equi-probable. Although AL is potentially manipulable, strategizing under it would be difficult in practice.
不可分割物品的二人公平分割:一种高效、无嫉妒的算法
对于在两个玩家之间分配一组不可分割的物品这一古老的问题,已经提出了许多方法。我们提出了一种新的算法(AL),与Brams和Taylor (BT)提出的算法相关,该算法只要求玩家严格地将项目从最好到最差排序。与BT不同的是,在同一回合中,任何由两个玩家命名的物品都进入“有争议的堆”,ai可以减少甚至消除有争议的堆,分配额外或更多的首选物品给玩家。人工智能产出是帕累托最优、无嫉妒和最大的分配;随着项目数量的增加(假设为偶数),如果所有可能的排名都是等概率的,那么ai分配所有项目的概率似乎接近无穷大。尽管人工智能具有潜在的可操纵性,但在实践中很难制定策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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