Policy Forum: Carbon Taxes and Fiscal Federalism in Canada—A New Wrinkle to an Old Problem

Tracy R. Snoddon
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Abstract

The federal government intends to increase its minimum carbon tax from $40 per tonne of carbon emissions to $170 per tonne by 2030. The carbon tax increase will have uneven and potentially large impacts on provincial emissions and carbon tax revenue, but little is known about how decisions to recycle these revenues will affect equalization payments to provinces. This article compares baseline equalization payments with simulated payments under various revenue-recycling scenarios given a $170 minimum carbon tax. The simulations demonstrate that recycling carbon tax revenues with offsetting reductions in provincial personal or business income taxes, for example, lowers overall disparities in provincial governments' revenue-raising abilities and reduces the size of the equalization program needed to address these disparities. The article draws attention to an already controversial design feature of the program, the fixed-growth rule. The simulations show that the fixed-growth rule limits the impact of higher carbon tax revenues on equalization, by adjusting payments to ensure that the overall size of the program grows roughly in line with the economy. As a result, any potential savings in aggregate equalization payments from revenue recycling are not realized. The distribution of payments is also affected by the fixed-growth rule. Overequalization often results, with Quebec and sometimes Ontario as the main beneficiaries.
政策论坛:加拿大的碳税和财政联邦制——一个老问题的新皱纹
联邦政府打算到2030年将最低碳税从每吨40美元提高到每吨170美元。碳税的增加将对各省的排放和碳税收入产生不平衡的、潜在的巨大影响,但人们对回收这些收入的决定将如何影响各省的平衡支付知之甚少。这篇文章比较了在不同的收入回收方案下的基准均衡支付和模拟支付,假设最低碳税为170美元。模拟表明,例如,通过减少省级个人或企业所得税来抵消碳税收入的回收,可以降低省级政府增加收入能力的总体差距,并减少解决这些差距所需的均衡计划的规模。这篇文章引起了人们对该程序的一个已经引起争议的设计特征的注意,即固定增长规则。模拟表明,固定增长规则通过调整支付以确保计划的总体规模与经济增长大致一致,限制了更高的碳税收入对平衡的影响。因此,没有实现从收入回收中节省总平衡付款的任何可能。支付的分配也受到固定增长规则的影响。结果往往是过度均衡,魁北克省(有时是安大略省)是主要受益者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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