The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class

J. Armour, L. Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Reinier H. Kraakman
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引用次数: 36

Abstract

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2017). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of corporate (or company) law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of corporate law across all jurisdictions, while individual chapters explore the diversity of jurisdictional approaches to the common problems of corporate law. In its third edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded. Chapter 3 examines legal strategies employed in representative “core jurisdictions” to mitigate manager-shareholder conflicts. Agency problems arise from two of the core features of the corporate form: investor ownership, which often results in ultimate control being held by shareholders far removed from the firm’s day-to-day operations; and delegated management, which opens up the possibility for opportunistic behavior. This chapter describes how legal strategies outlined in Chapter 2 of the book are utilized to solve the trade-offs resulting from the interaction of investor ownership with delegated management. It describes the use of appointment rights, by which shareholders retain the right to appoint and remove directors. Next, it focuses on core decision rights and how their effectiveness is related to the problem of shareholder coordination costs. It then considers reward strategies and independent directors as a popular trusteeship strategy, while also highlighting differences in and commonalities in the regulation of executive compensation. The chapter briefly reviews legal rules and standards and disclosure as additional tools, before reflecting upon why some divergence in the basic corporate governance structure persists across our sample jurisdictions.
基本治理结构:股东作为一个阶级的利益
本文是《公司法解剖:比较和功能方法》第三版的第三章,作者是Reinier Kraakman、John Armour、Paul Davies、Luca Enriques、Henry Hansmann、Gerard Hertig、Klaus Hopt、Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler、Georg Ringe和Edward Rock(牛津大学出版社,2017)。该书整体上对欧洲、美国和日本的公司法进行了功能分析。它的组织反映了所有司法管辖区的公司法结构,而个别章节则探讨了公司法常见问题的司法管辖区方法的多样性。在第三版中,这本书进行了重大修订和扩充。第三章考察了代表性“核心司法管辖区”为缓解经理人-股东冲突所采用的法律策略。代理问题源于公司形式的两个核心特征:投资者所有权,这往往导致最终控制权掌握在远离公司日常运营的股东手中;委派管理为机会主义行为提供了可能。本章描述了如何利用本书第2章中概述的法律策略来解决投资者所有权与委托管理的相互作用所产生的权衡。它描述了任命权的使用,即股东保留任命和罢免董事的权利。其次,重点分析了核心决策权及其有效性与股东协调成本问题的关系。然后,它将奖励策略和独立董事视为一种流行的托管策略,同时也强调了高管薪酬监管的差异和共同点。本章简要回顾了作为附加工具的法律规则和标准以及信息披露,然后思考了为什么在我们的样本司法管辖区中,基本公司治理结构存在一些分歧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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