Understanding Promotion-as-a-Service on GitHub

Kun Du, Hao Yang, Yubao Zhang, Haixin Duan, Haining Wang, S. Hao, Zhou Li, Min Yang
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

As the world’s leading software development platform, GitHub has become a social networking site for programmers and recruiters who leverage its social features, such as star and fork, for career and business development. However, in this paper, we found a group of GitHub accounts that conducted promotion services in GitHub, called “promoters”, by performing paid star and fork operations on specified repositories. We also uncovered a stealthy way of tampering with historical commits, through which these promoters are able to fake commits retroactively. By exploiting such a promotion service, any GitHub user can pretend to be a skillful developer with high influence. To understand promotion services in GitHub, we first investigated the underground promotion market of GitHub and identified 1,023 suspected promotion accounts from the market. Then, we developed an SVM (Support Vector Machine) classifier to detect promotion accounts from all active users extracted from GH Archive ranging from 2015 to 2019. In total, we detected 63,872 suspected promotion accounts. We further analyzed these suspected promotion accounts, showing that (1) a hidden functionality in GitHub is abused to boost the reputation of an account by forging historical commits and (2) a group of small businesses exploit GitHub promotion services to promote their products. We estimated that suspicious promoters could have made a profit of $3.41 million and $4.37 million in 2018 and 2019, respectively.
了解GitHub上的推广即服务
作为全球领先的软件开发平台,GitHub已经成为程序员和招聘人员利用其社交功能(如star和fork)进行职业和业务发展的社交网站。然而,在本文中,我们发现了一组在GitHub中进行推广服务的GitHub帐户,称为“推广者”,通过在指定的存储库上执行付费的星型和分叉操作。我们还发现了一种篡改历史提交的隐蔽方式,通过这种方式,这些促进程序能够追溯地伪造提交。通过利用这种推广服务,任何GitHub用户都可以假装是一个具有高影响力的熟练开发人员。为了了解GitHub的推广服务,我们首先调查了GitHub的地下推广市场,从市场中发现了1023个可疑的推广账户。然后,我们开发了一个SVM(支持向量机)分类器来检测从GH Archive中提取的2015年至2019年的所有活跃用户的促销账户。我们总共发现了63872个可疑的推广账户。我们进一步分析了这些可疑的推广账户,发现:(1)GitHub中的一个隐藏功能被滥用,通过伪造历史提交来提高账户的声誉;(2)一群小企业利用GitHub的推广服务来推广他们的产品。我们估计,可疑的发起人可能在2018年和2019年分别获利341万美元和437万美元。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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