{"title":"Between Scylla and Charybdis","authors":"M. Nathan","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190095482.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines the development of the reductionism vs. antireductionism debate, which has set the stage for philosophical analyses of science since the early decades of the twentieth century. The point of departure is the rise and fall of the classical model of reduction, epitomized by the work of Ernest Nagel. Next is the subsequent forging of the “antireductionist consensus” and the “reductionist anti-consensus.” The chapter concludes by arguing how modest reductionism and sophisticated antireductionism substantially overlap, making the dispute more terminological than it is often appreciated. Even more problematically, friends and foes of reductionism share an overly restrictive characterization of the interface between levels of explanation. Thus, it is time for philosophy to move away from these intertwining strands, which fail to capture the productive interplay between knowledge and ignorance in science, and to develop new categories for charting the nature and advancement of science.","PeriodicalId":166439,"journal":{"name":"Black Boxes","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Black Boxes","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190095482.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter outlines the development of the reductionism vs. antireductionism debate, which has set the stage for philosophical analyses of science since the early decades of the twentieth century. The point of departure is the rise and fall of the classical model of reduction, epitomized by the work of Ernest Nagel. Next is the subsequent forging of the “antireductionist consensus” and the “reductionist anti-consensus.” The chapter concludes by arguing how modest reductionism and sophisticated antireductionism substantially overlap, making the dispute more terminological than it is often appreciated. Even more problematically, friends and foes of reductionism share an overly restrictive characterization of the interface between levels of explanation. Thus, it is time for philosophy to move away from these intertwining strands, which fail to capture the productive interplay between knowledge and ignorance in science, and to develop new categories for charting the nature and advancement of science.