The Formation Mechanism of SMEs' Credit Risk Under Supply Chain Finance Based on Game Theory

Hao Du, H. Kuang, Xin Zhang
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have difficulty in financing are the weak link in the supply chain. In recent years, with the development of the supply chain management concept and financial institutions business, the supply chain financial model emerges as the times require. It not only helps SMEs in the supply chain to finance, but assists the core enterprises to expand their business scope and obtain value-added profits, which has become an effective way to solve the financing difficulty of SMEs. This paper in the supply chain studies the formation mechanism of credit risk of SMEs by using the game model. The paper obtains the factors that affect the credit risk through the balanced income of banks and core enterprises in the game model and analyzes the behavior decision-making and the probability of occurrence of credit risk of SMEs and banks via using the revenue function. And it reveals the formation mechanism of credit risk of SMEs and makes up for the existing research on the formation mechanism of credit risk without SMEs in the supply chain finance. Eventually, combined with the specific results of the game model, it puts forward practical suggestions for the participants of the supply chain finance to reduce the credit risk and promote the win-win of the participation of the supply chain finance. Eventually, combined with the specific results of the game model, it puts forward practical suggestions for the participants of the supply chain finance to reduce the credit risk and promote the win-win of the participation of the supply chain finance.
基于博弈论的供应链金融下中小企业信用风险形成机制
融资困难的中小企业是供应链中的薄弱环节。近年来,随着供应链管理理念和金融机构业务的发展,供应链金融模式应运而生。它不仅可以帮助供应链上的中小企业融资,还可以帮助核心企业扩大经营范围,获得增值利润,成为解决中小企业融资难的有效途径。本文运用博弈模型对供应链中小企业信用风险的形成机制进行了研究。本文通过博弈模型中银行与核心企业的均衡收益得到影响信用风险的因素,并利用收益函数分析中小企业与银行的行为决策和信用风险发生的概率。揭示了中小企业信用风险的形成机制,弥补了现有供应链金融中没有中小企业参与的信用风险形成机制研究的不足。最后,结合博弈模型的具体结果,为供应链金融的参与者降低信用风险,促进供应链金融参与的共赢提出切实可行的建议。最后,结合博弈模型的具体结果,为供应链金融的参与者降低信用风险,促进供应链金融参与的共赢提出切实可行的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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