{"title":"Infinity and Unity","authors":"O. Nachtomy","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190907327.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores the connection between infinity and unity. According to Leibniz, any living being admits of both infinite complexity and strict unity. The author develops an analogy between numerical and metaphysical unity: while substantial unities are presupposed by aggregates, a substantial unity is also presupposed by a substance’s infinite qualities, or by its sequence of states and perceptions. This point is exemplified and developed through Leibniz’s use of a law of a series to define an individual substance. The author seeks to show that Leibniz’s qualification of a substance as “one being” is primarily intended to emphasize the essential unity and indivisibility of a substance. This claim can also be expressed by noting that unity per se (or an indivisible unity) implies numerical oneness but not vice versa.","PeriodicalId":399285,"journal":{"name":"Living Mirrors","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Living Mirrors","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190907327.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter explores the connection between infinity and unity. According to Leibniz, any living being admits of both infinite complexity and strict unity. The author develops an analogy between numerical and metaphysical unity: while substantial unities are presupposed by aggregates, a substantial unity is also presupposed by a substance’s infinite qualities, or by its sequence of states and perceptions. This point is exemplified and developed through Leibniz’s use of a law of a series to define an individual substance. The author seeks to show that Leibniz’s qualification of a substance as “one being” is primarily intended to emphasize the essential unity and indivisibility of a substance. This claim can also be expressed by noting that unity per se (or an indivisible unity) implies numerical oneness but not vice versa.