Inside and Outside Perspectives on Institutions: An Economic Theory of the Noble Lie

Cameron Harwick
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

If there exist no incentive or selective mechanisms that make cooperation in large groups incentive-compatible under realistic circumstances, functional social institutions will require subjective preferences to diverge from objective payoffs – a “noble lie.” This implies the existence of irreducible and irreconcilable “inside” and “outside” perspectives on social institutions; that is, between foundationalist and functionalist approaches, both of which have a long pedigree in political economy. The conflict between the two, and the inability in practice to dispense with either, has a number of surprising implications for human organizations, including the impossibility of algorithmic governance, the necessity of discretionary rule enforcement in the breach, and the difficulty of an ethical economics of institutions. Leeson and Suarez argue that “some superstitions, and perhaps many, support self-governing arrangements. The relationship between such scientifically false beliefs and private institutions is symbiotic and socially productive” (2015, 48). This paper stakes out a stronger claim: that something like superstition is essential for any governance arrangement, self- or otherwise. Specifically, we argue that human social structure both requires and maintains a systematic divergence between subjective preferences and objective payoffs, in a way that usually (though in principle does not necessarily) entails “scientifically false beliefs” for at least a subset of agents. We will refer to the basis of such preferences from the perspective of those holding them as an “inside perspective,” as opposed to a functionalist-evolutionary explanation of their existence, which we will call an “outside perspective.” Drawing on the theory of cooperation, we then show that the two perspectives are in principle irreconcilable, discussing some implications of that fact for political economy and the prospects of social organization.
制度的内外视角:一个关于高尚谎言的经济学理论
如果不存在激励机制或选择机制,使大群体合作在现实情况下与激励兼容,那么功能性社会制度将要求主观偏好偏离客观回报——这是一个“高尚的谎言”。这意味着对社会制度存在不可简化和不可调和的“内部”和“外部”观点;也就是说,在基础主义和功能主义方法之间,这两种方法在政治经济学中都有悠久的历史。两者之间的冲突,以及在实践中无法免除任何一方,对人类组织产生了许多令人惊讶的影响,包括算法治理的不可能性,违约时酌情执行规则的必要性,以及制度伦理经济学的困难。李森和苏亚雷斯认为,“有些迷信,也许是很多迷信,支持自治安排。这种科学错误信念与私人机构之间的关系是共生的,具有社会生产力”(2015,48)。本文提出了一个更有力的主张:迷信之类的东西对于任何治理安排都是必不可少的,无论是自我治理还是其他治理安排。具体来说,我们认为人类社会结构要求并维持主观偏好和客观回报之间的系统差异,这种差异通常(尽管原则上不一定)导致至少一部分主体产生“科学错误信念”。我们将从那些持有偏好的人的角度出发,将这些偏好的基础称为“内部视角”,而不是功能主义者-进化主义者对其存在的解释,我们将称之为“外部视角”。利用合作理论,我们展示了这两种观点在原则上是不可调和的,并讨论了这一事实对政治经济学和社会组织前景的一些影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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