Continuities and Discontinuities Between Imagination and Memory: The View from Philosophy

K. Michaelian, D. Perrin, André Sant’Anna
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引用次数: 27

Abstract

Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view—standard in the philosophy of memory—that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them—and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.
想象与记忆的连续性与非连续性:哲学视角
尽管想象和记忆有很多共同之处,但迄今为止,研究记忆的哲学家们对想象几乎没有什么可说的。这种情况最近开始发生改变,因为对情景记忆的研究表明,情景记忆是一种类似于情景未来思维的想象性心理时间旅行形式,这可能会破坏记忆哲学中的标准观点——记忆与想象截然不同。本章涵盖了一系列相互关联的问题(包括心理时间旅行的对象、情景性思维的参照、未来认知的开放性、我们对过去知识的直接性、以及通过情景记忆和情景性未来思维的错误识别而对错误的免疫),调查了不连续论者和持续论者之间的争论,不连续论者认为情景性记忆和情景性未来思维是根本不同类型的过程,他们认为他们有不同的时间取向这一事实构成了他们之间唯一重要的区别,因此情景记忆最终只是一种情景想象。
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