Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking

Itai Agur, M. Demertzis
{"title":"Monetary Policy and Excessive Bank Risk Taking","authors":"Itai Agur, M. Demertzis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1950167","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"If monetary policy is to aim at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form model with endogenous bank risk profiles. Policy rates affect both bank incentives to search for yield and the cost of wholesale funding. Financial stability objectives are then shown to make a monetary authority more conservative and more aggressive. Conservative as it sets higher rates on average. And aggressive because, in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived than otherwise. Keeping cuts short is crucial as bank risk responds primarily to stable low rates. Within the short span, cuts then must be deep to achieve standard objectives.","PeriodicalId":258154,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Monetary Economics & Interest Rates (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"35","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Monetary Economics & Interest Rates (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1950167","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 35

Abstract

If monetary policy is to aim at financial stability, how would it change? To analyze this question, this paper develops a general-form model with endogenous bank risk profiles. Policy rates affect both bank incentives to search for yield and the cost of wholesale funding. Financial stability objectives are then shown to make a monetary authority more conservative and more aggressive. Conservative as it sets higher rates on average. And aggressive because, in reaction to negative shocks, cuts are deeper but shorter-lived than otherwise. Keeping cuts short is crucial as bank risk responds primarily to stable low rates. Within the short span, cuts then must be deep to achieve standard objectives.
货币政策与银行过度风险承担
如果货币政策的目标是金融稳定,它将如何改变?为了分析这一问题,本文建立了一个具有内生银行风险特征的通用模型。政策利率既影响银行追求收益的动机,也影响批发融资的成本。然后,金融稳定目标被证明会使货币当局更保守、更激进。保守是因为它设定了更高的平均利率。之所以激进,是因为在应对负面冲击时,削减幅度更大,但持续时间更短。短期降息至关重要,因为银行风险主要是对稳定的低利率做出反应。在短期内,必须大幅削减以达到标准目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信