Monitoring Immigration Enforcement

Stephen Lee
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引用次数: 11

Abstract

More than two-thirds of the unauthorized immigrant population - roughly eight million out of 11.2 million - is in our nation’s workforce, and growing evidence suggests that unauthorized workers are more likely than their authorized counterparts to experience workplace-related violations. Although scholars have begun shifting their focus to the agencies empowered to regulate immigrants in the workplace, important questions remain unanswered. Why, for example, has the Department of Labor (“DOL”), our nation’s top labor enforcement agency, struggled to protect unauthorized workers against this exploitation despite the scope and seriousness of the problem? And why has Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), our nation’s top immigration enforcement agency, resisted taking into account the labor consequences of their actions? Our ignorance is becoming increasingly indefensible given that agencies often have the final word within an immigration universe characterized by legislative stasis. A closer look reveals a peculiar dynamic: ICE has relatively little interest in regulating the relationship between employers and unauthorized workers, while the DOL has a relatively high interest but lacks the autonomy to effectively do so - a dynamic that tends to foster interagency conflict, ultimately enabling the problem of labor exploitation to persist. What is the way out? Borrowing the insights of administrative law scholars, this Article argues that increasing the ability of the DOL to monitor immigration enforcement decisions can help minimize the externalities that ICE actions ordinarily force the DOL to absorb. This monitoring framework constrains the ex ante stage of decision-making, complements existing immigration scholarship (which has tended to focus on ex post remedies like expanding the ability of the DOL to issue temporary visas), and pushes back on ICE’s law enforcement culture (which has traditionally resisted the incorporation of labor norms). Moreover, the monitoring framework is able to track evolving problems of coordination and to identify emerging vulnerabilities as the Executive’s immigration enforcement authority continues to grow and outpace the development of adequate constraints on the exercise of that authority.
监察入境执法
超过三分之二的非法移民——1120万人中的大约800万人——是我们国家的劳动力,越来越多的证据表明,非法移民比合法移民更有可能经历与工作场所有关的违规行为。尽管学者们已经开始将注意力转移到那些有权在工作场所监管移民的机构上,但一些重要问题仍未得到解答。例如,尽管问题的范围和严重性如此之大,为什么我们国家最高的劳工执法机构劳工部(“DOL”)仍在努力保护未经授权的工人免受这种剥削?为什么我们国家的最高移民执法机构移民和海关执法局(ICE)拒绝考虑他们的行为对劳工的影响?我们的无知正变得越来越站不住脚,因为在以立法停滞为特征的移民领域,机构往往拥有最终决定权。仔细观察就会发现一种特殊的动态:ICE对监管雇主和未经授权的工人之间的关系兴趣相对较少,而DOL对监管雇主和未经授权的工人之间的关系兴趣相对较高,但缺乏有效监管的自主权——这种动态往往会助长机构间的冲突,最终使劳动剥削问题持续存在。出路是什么?借鉴行政法学者的见解,本文认为,提高美国劳工部监督移民执法决定的能力有助于最大限度地减少ICE行动通常迫使美国劳工部吸收的外部性。这种监督框架限制了事前的决策阶段,补充了现有的移民学术(其往往侧重于事后补救措施,如扩大美国劳工部发放临时签证的能力),并阻碍了ICE的执法文化(传统上抵制纳入劳工规范)。此外,监测框架能够跟踪不断演变的协调问题,并查明随着行政当局的移民执法权力继续扩大并超过对该权力行使的适当限制的发展而出现的脆弱性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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