The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense

W. Cui
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Since 2018, the UK government, the European Commission, and several European national governments have advanced bold proposals for a new “digital services tax” (DST), with the aim of capturing profits earned by multinationals that reflect value contributed by users of digital platforms. I offer a novel set of arguments in support of the DST, which appeal to both efficiency and fairness considerations. In particular, the DST would allow location-specific rent (LSR) earned by digital platforms to be captured by the countries in which such rent arises. I argue that platform LSR is often hidden from view under the traditional international income taxation paradigm, due to that paradigm’s focus on physical presence, source of payment, and profit allocation among related entities. Moreover, that paradigm ignores a basic intuition about how rent accruing to mobile intangible assets should be assigned: when the deployment of a technology is non-rival with respect to multiple locations, it is both efficient and fair to assign any rent earned from the technology’s deployment with respect to a given location to that location. The principle of taxing platform rent where it arises is both distinct from and superior to the principle of allocating profit to “destination” (i.e. buyer or consumer) jurisdictions. Platform rent can arise in origin, destination, or residence jurisdictions, and the location of “user value creation” is not reducible to consumer location. Moreover, claims to taxing rights based on the location of rent inherently appeals to equity considerations, whereas destination-based apportionment generally ignores equity issues in allocation. I discuss misunderstandings of DST proposals, and reject certain common assertions about the DST’s likely effects, including that DST costs will simply be passed on domestic consumers or producers, and that a revenue-based tax is inherently flawed. Finally, I suggest that the potential of the DST to reduce excessive entry in platform markets also deserves further consideration.
数字服务税:一个概念上的辩护
自2018年以来,英国政府、欧盟委员会和几个欧洲国家政府提出了大胆的新“数字服务税”(DST)提案,旨在征收反映数字平台用户贡献价值的跨国公司利润。我提供了一组新颖的论据来支持夏令时,这些论据呼吁从效率和公平两方面考虑。特别是,DST将允许数字平台赚取的特定地点租金(LSR)由产生这种租金的国家获取。我认为,在传统的国际所得税范式下,平台LSR往往被隐藏起来,因为该范式关注的是实体存在、支付来源和相关实体之间的利润分配。此外,该范式忽略了关于如何分配移动无形资产的租金的基本直觉:当一项技术的部署相对于多个地点是非竞争性的时,将技术部署相对于给定地点获得的任何租金分配给该地点既有效又公平。对平台租金征税的原则既不同于将利润分配给“目的地”(即买方或消费者)管辖的原则,也优于这一原则。平台租金可能出现在原产地、目的地或居住地,“用户价值创造”的地点不能简化为消费者所在地。此外,基于租金地点的征税权主张本身就吸引了公平考虑,而基于目的地的分配通常忽略了分配中的公平问题。我讨论了对夏时制提案的误解,并驳斥了关于夏时制可能产生的影响的某些常见断言,包括夏时制成本将简单地转嫁给国内消费者或生产商,以及基于收入的税收本身就是有缺陷的。最后,我认为DST在减少平台市场过度进入方面的潜力也值得进一步考虑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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