Cosmopolitism and Issues of Ethical Identity

K. Appiah
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Y. A: What, if any, moral obligations are attached to our ethnic identity? [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] KAA: I'm inclined to say that the most straightforward answer to your questions is: None. That's because I think it's not the ethnic identity itself but the particular features of the way it works in social and ethical life that is likely to generate moral obligations, not the ethnic identity as such. In a moment, I'll give you some examples of the sort of thing I have in mind. But first, I think it's important to distinguish between ethnic identities and national identities in approaching this question. By national identities, I mean, roughly, ethnic identities that are identified with a modern nation state. For national identities, the major obligations we have are in virtue of our shared citizenship: they are political obligations, civic duties. But where an ethnic identity is not a national one, where it is not associated with a state, the answers are more various, I believe, because ethnic identities are various and so are the relations of individual people to their ethnic identities. As you know, I am inclined to approach such questions from the perspective of the individual. So I would begin by saying that one of the central questions many people have, wherever they live, is whether they take their ethnic identity up as an important element of who they are. I don't say "whether they chose to take their ethnic identity up," because in some contexts you may have little choice as to whether you take your ethnic identity seriously, because you live in a society where others will respond to you as a member of some ethnic group, whether you like it or not. What sociologists call "ascriptive identities"--like gender and, in may places, race-shape your experience of the social world because others are going to respond to you as a member of the group, whatever you chose. Of course, you still have choices to make, about how you are going to respond to an identity ascribed to you by others. But where your identity is a subordinated identity, so that powerful social groups are able to dominate people of your ethnicity, one natural response is to develop a norm of solidarity: we will work together to relieve our social burden. What sort of argument could you develop for the view that this might be not just a natural response, nor even just an attractive response, but an actual duty? Well, if there are other members of your group who are engaging in a social movement to relieve the burdens of ethnic oppression, and you are benefiting from their struggle, you might have a duty to bear your fair share of the burden of the struggle. After all, we normally suppose that we have a duty of fairness to share the burdens of sustaining institutions and practices from which we profit. (That's why we often condemn so-called "free-riders": people who, metaphorically speaking, take the train but don't pay for the ticket.) These obligations go along with obligations that everyone has, which derive from considerations of justice, to work to undo social oppression. You might also think that where an ethnic group is carrying a particular cultural tradition that is of value, its members might feel they ought each to contribute to protecting that cultural tradition, as long as doing so doesn't place a great burden on them, something that will get in the way of their living a decent life. People who are especially well-placed to contribute to an important goal ought, generally speaking, I think, to pursue it if they can. So, against a particular background, I think ethnic obligations can arise, but, as I say, I think it does just depend on the background. And usually what sustains ethnic practices isn't duty but desire: people value some of the ways of doing things that they grew up with and they keep them going for that reason, not because they feel obliged. Even when they do feel obliged, it will often be an obligation of piety--a sense that you should do things for your parents and earlier ancestors, to sustain a legacy they have left you. …
世界主义与伦理认同问题
Y. A:如果有的话,我们的民族身份有什么道德义务?[插图省略]KAA:我倾向于说,对你的问题最直接的回答是:没有。这是因为我认为不是种族认同本身而是它在社会和伦理生活中运作方式的特定特征可能会产生道德义务,而不是种族认同本身。过一会儿,我将给你们举一些我脑子里想到的例子。但首先,我认为在处理这个问题时,区分种族认同和国家认同是很重要的。我所说的国家认同,大致是指与现代民族国家认同的民族认同。就国家身份而言,我们的主要义务是基于我们共同的公民身份:它们是政治义务、公民义务。但是当一个民族的身份不是一个国家的身份,它不与一个国家联系在一起的时候,我相信答案就更多样了,因为民族的身份是多种多样的,个人与他们的民族身份的关系也是多种多样的。如你所知,我倾向于从个人的角度来处理这类问题。所以我首先要说的是,许多人,无论他们住在哪里,都有一个核心问题,那就是他们是否把自己的种族认同作为他们是谁的一个重要因素。我不会说“他们是否选择接受自己的种族认同”,因为在某些情况下,你可能没有多少选择来认真对待自己的种族认同,因为你生活在一个社会里,不管你喜欢与否,别人都会把你当作某个种族群体的一员。社会学家所说的“归属身份”——比如性别,在很多地方还包括种族——塑造了你对社会世界的体验,因为不管你选择什么,其他人都会把你当作这个群体的一员来回应。当然,你仍然有选择要做,关于你将如何回应别人赋予你的身份。但是,如果你的身份是一种从属身份,那么强大的社会团体就能够支配你的种族,一种自然的反应是建立一种团结的规范:我们将共同努力减轻我们的社会负担。你能提出什么样的论据来证明这可能不仅仅是一种自然反应,甚至不仅仅是一种吸引人的反应,而是一种实际的责任?如果你的群体中有其他成员参与了一场社会运动,以减轻种族压迫的负担,而你从他们的斗争中受益,你可能有责任承担你的公平份额的斗争负担。毕竟,我们通常认为,我们有公平的责任,分担维持我们从中获利的机构和实践的负担。(这就是为什么我们经常谴责所谓的“搭便车者”:打个比方说,那些坐火车却不买票的人。)这些义务与每个人的义务相辅相成,这些义务源于对正义的考虑,即努力消除社会压迫。你可能还会认为,当一个民族承载着一种特殊的有价值的文化传统时,它的成员可能会觉得他们每个人都应该为保护这种文化传统做出贡献,只要这样做不会给他们带来很大的负担,不会妨碍他们过上体面的生活。一般来说,我认为,那些特别有能力为一个重要目标做出贡献的人,应该尽可能地去追求它。因此,在特定的背景下,我认为民族义务可能会出现,但正如我所说,我认为这只是取决于背景。通常,维系民族习俗的不是责任,而是欲望:人们看重他们从小到的一些做事方式,他们坚持下去是出于这个原因,而不是因为他们觉得有义务这么做。即使他们真的觉得有义务,那也往往是一种虔诚的义务——一种你应该为父母和更早的祖先做些事情的感觉,以维持他们留给你的遗产。…
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