Bubbling (or just frothy) house prices

Massimo Guidolin, Elizabeth A. La Jeunesse
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Real U.S. house prices, on average, have appreciated by 6 percent annually since 2000, a historically high rate when compared with the 2.7 percent annual rate between 1975 and 1999. Certain states have had especially high average annual rates since 2000: 12 percent in California, 11 percent in Rhode Island, and 10 percent in Nevada, Hawaii, and Florida. With such high rates of house price growth, many experts in the press and academic circles have debated whether we are currently facing a house price bubble. House price bubbles are characterized by homebuyer expectations of unusually rapid price appreciation. Thus, many buy a home they consider expensive, in relation to current rental prices, under the expectation of continued price increases. When buyers perceive that prices have stopped increasing, however, expectations normalize and demand falls. House prices fall as the bubble “bursts.” Economic consequences of a potential housing burst are especially worrisome. Lower home values reduce homeowners’ wealth, causing significant declines in consumer demand and thus in GDP. In fact, Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001) point out that the elasticity of consumption to housing wealth appears much higher than the elasticity to stock market equity. History further indicates that banks’ balance sheets—when proper risk management strategies are not in place—can be heavily exposed to price bursts in real estate. For these reasons, policymakers are keen on trying to identify the presence of a bubble. Although criteria for detecting a bubble are debatable, we present a standard indicator of house affordability— prices divided by per capita income (P/I)—for all states plus the District of Columbia. (See map.) P/I provides a better measure than house price appreciation because it accounts for the evolution of income, a key factor in housing demand. California, New York, and Massachusetts, for instance, have high P/I ratios. According to our calculations of P/I growth rates, if bubble conditions do exist, they appear only on the two coasts and in Michigan. Since 2000, for example, the average P/I ratios for California, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, and New York have been at least 13 percent above their respective averages for the 1975-99 period. On the other hand, the same 2000-05 P/I measure for Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and North Dakota has declined by 24 percent below its average for the 1975-99 period. Yet, do the P/I ratios observed on the two coasts constitute a bubble? Note that when real estate is evaluated as a potential investment, housing prices should be determined by discounting the expected flow of income (rents) and other services using an appropriate risk-adjusted capitalization rate. Considering the difference between capitalization rates implied by house price indices and long-term government bond yields, we find indications against the presence of a bubble. House price data imply that the spread between capitalization rates and long-term bond yields has increased from an average level of 0.7 percent for the period 1975-99 to an average level of 2.3 percent for the period since 2000. These positive spreads imply that house prices have in fact remained consistent with risk-adjusted discounting of future rents. In fact, the spread has increased substantially in all 50 states (and the District of Columbia) between the 1975-99 period and the more recent period since 2000. Even in states that have comparatively low spreads (e.g., California and Massachusetts), the figure has remained positive and more than doubled between the two periods. In conclusion, the evidence in favor of a recent housing bubble is controversial at best. Ongoing research is struggling to isolate real house price increases justified by underlying fundamentals from irrational, possibly harmful, excesses. Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley, and Robert J. Shiller, “Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market versus the Housing Market.” Working Paper No. 8606, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. Bubbling (or Just Frothy) House Prices?
房价泡沫(或只是泡沫)
自2000年以来,美国实际房价平均每年上涨6%,创历史新高,而1975年至1999年间的年涨幅为2.7%。自2000年以来,某些州的平均年增长率特别高:加利福尼亚州为12%,罗德岛州为11%,内华达州、夏威夷和佛罗里达州为10%。在如此高的房价增长率下,媒体和学术界的许多专家都在争论我们目前是否面临房价泡沫。房价泡沫的特征是购房者对房价异常快速升值的预期。因此,许多人在预期房价会继续上涨的情况下,购买了他们认为相对于当前租金价格昂贵的房子。然而,当买家认为价格已经停止上涨时,预期就会恢复正常,需求就会下降。随着泡沫“破裂”,房价下跌。潜在的房地产泡沫破裂的经济后果尤其令人担忧。较低的房屋价值减少了房主的财富,导致消费需求大幅下降,从而导致GDP大幅下降。事实上,Case、Quigley和Shiller(2001)指出,消费对住房财富的弹性似乎远高于对股票市场权益的弹性。历史进一步表明,当适当的风险管理策略不到位时,银行的资产负债表可能会严重暴露在房地产价格飙升的风险之下。由于这些原因,政策制定者热衷于试图确定泡沫的存在。尽管检测泡沫的标准存在争议,但我们提出了一个衡量住房负担能力的标准指标——价格除以人均收入(P/I)——适用于所有州和哥伦比亚特区。(见地图)。P/I比房价升值提供了一个更好的衡量标准,因为它反映了收入的演变,而收入是住房需求的一个关键因素。例如,加州、纽约和马萨诸塞州的市盈率就很高。根据我们对市盈率增长率的计算,如果泡沫条件确实存在,它们只出现在两个海岸和密歇根州。例如,自2000年以来,加州、马萨诸塞州、俄勒冈州、罗德岛州和纽约州的平均市盈率至少比1975年至1999年期间各自的平均水平高出13%。另一方面,同样的2000- 2005年,德克萨斯州、俄克拉荷马州、密西西比州和北达科他州的市盈率比1975- 1999年的平均水平下降了24%。然而,在两岸观察到的市盈率是否构成泡沫?请注意,当房地产作为一项潜在投资进行评估时,房价应通过使用适当的风险调整资本化率贴现预期收入流(租金)和其他服务来确定。考虑到房价指数和长期政府债券收益率隐含的资本化率之间的差异,我们发现了反对泡沫存在的迹象。房价数据表明,资本化率和长期债券收益率之间的差距已经从1975- 1999年的平均水平0.7%上升到2000年以来的平均水平2.3%。这些正价差意味着,房价实际上与未来租金的风险调整折现保持一致。事实上,在1975- 1999年和2000年以来的最近时期,在所有50个州(和哥伦比亚特区)的传播都大幅增加。即使在息差相对较低的州(如加利福尼亚和马萨诸塞州),这一数字仍为正值,在这两个时期之间翻了一倍多。总之,支持近期房地产泡沫的证据充其量是有争议的。正在进行的研究正在努力将基本面因素所证明的实际房价上涨与非理性的、可能有害的过度上涨区分开来。Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley, Robert J. Shiller, <财富效应的比较:股票市场与房地产市场>工作文件第8606号,国家经济研究局,2001。房价泡沫(还是只是泡沫)?
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