Property as Rhetoric in Law

Abstract

It is nearly a decade since I first examined Peirce's semiotic tenet, which is that the theory of a "new" rhetoric, or what he calls Speculative Rhetoric, is synonymous with what he means by the Method or Methodology of semiotic inquiry.' But it is the centennial anniversary of that moment of insight in Peirce's long and complex career when, in 1892, he first calls attention to a major distinction between a doctrine of signs and his own pragmatic method of semiotics: the former is but a crystal, he says, while the latter ferments, grows, corrects itself, becomes complex and in a word, evolves, since all meaningful ideas, as sign-systems, evolve and become ever more complex.2 A decade later in 1902, he defines or redefines his earlier definition of Rhetoric, of the 1865 period, into the notion of Rhetoric as Semiotic Methodology.3 By 1910 he has clearly set out his idea of the very purpose of semiotic inquiry, which is to bring together two or more universes of inquiry or semiotic sign-systems into relationship, into ever more general comprehensiveness and meaning.4 It is the idea of Property in logic and Property in law which becomes, I argue here, the chief instrument for expanding traditional logic into semiotic logic, by understanding the concept of Property as a device of Rhetoric, i.e., of Semiotic Methodology. Thus law becomes prototypical of semiotics, in process, practice, and theory, by means of a more complex and continually evolving concept of Property. From shifting perspectives I have, in recent years, examined the relations between Property, Rhetoric, and Law as key ideas of Semiotics; here I will speak on Property as Rhetoric in Law and thus further my inquiry.5 I begin with Bentham: the idea of Property, in law and in traditional logic, as a rhetorical device or strategy is not new with Peirce, nor with me. For example, Bentham explicitly speaks of Property as a "means" or a method an instrument or tool for bringing about estimation and evaluation of people by others in society. Although Bentham wants to restrict the use of the term