The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act

P. Sastry
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

At the height of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Federal Reserve conducted emergency lending under authority granted to it in the third paragraph of Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. This article explores the political and legislative origins of the section, focusing on why Congress chose to endow the central bank with such an authority. The author describes how in the initial passage of the act in 1913, Congress demonstrated its steadfast commitment to the ?real bills? doctrine in two interrelated ways: 1) by limiting what assets the Fed could purchase, discount, and use as collateral for advances, and 2) by ensuring that any newly created government-sponsored credit enterprises were kept separate from the Federal Reserve System. During the Great Depression, however, Congress passed legislation that blurred the line between monetary and credit policy, slowly chipping away at the real bills doctrine as it sought to combat the crisis. It was in this context that Congress added Section 13(3) to the Federal Reserve Act. In tracing this history, the author concludes that the original framers of Section 13(3) meant to sanction direct Federal Reserve lending to the real economy, rather than simply to a weakened financial sector, in emergency circumstances. This Depression-era history provides insights into the evolving role of the Federal Reserve as an emergency provider of liquidity.
《联邦储备法》第13(3)条的政治渊源
在2007- 2009年金融危机最严重的时候,美联储根据《联邦储备法》第13条第3段授予它的权力进行了紧急贷款。本文探讨了这一章节的政治和立法起源,重点是国会为什么选择赋予中央银行这样的权力。作者描述了1913年该法案最初通过时,国会是如何展示其对“真正法案”的坚定承诺的。在两个相互关联的方面:1)通过限制美联储可以购买、贴现和用作预付款抵押品的资产;2)通过确保任何新成立的政府支持的信贷企业与联邦储备系统分开。然而,在大萧条期间,国会通过的立法模糊了货币政策和信贷政策之间的界限,在寻求对抗危机的过程中,慢慢削弱了实际票据原则。正是在这种背景下,国会在《联邦储备法》中增加了第13(3)条。在追溯这段历史的过程中,作者得出结论,第13(3)条的最初制定者意在批准美联储在紧急情况下直接向实体经济提供贷款,而不仅仅是向疲弱的金融部门提供贷款。这段大萧条时期的历史,让我们了解到美联储作为紧急流动性提供者的角色在不断演变。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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