Madvex: Instrumentation-based Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Malware Detection

Nils Loose, Felix Mächtle, Claudius Pott, V. Bezsmertnyĭ, T. Eisenbarth
{"title":"Madvex: Instrumentation-based Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Malware Detection","authors":"Nils Loose, Felix Mächtle, Claudius Pott, V. Bezsmertnyĭ, T. Eisenbarth","doi":"10.48550/arXiv.2305.02559","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"WebAssembly (Wasm) is a low-level binary format for web applications, which has found widespread adoption due to its improved performance and compatibility with existing software. However, the popularity of Wasm has also led to its exploitation for malicious purposes, such as cryptojacking, where malicious actors use a victim's computing resources to mine cryptocurrencies without their consent. To counteract this threat, machine learning-based detection methods aiming to identify cryptojacking activities within Wasm code have emerged. It is well-known that neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks, where inputs to a classifier are perturbed with minimal changes that result in a crass misclassification. While applying changes in image classification is easy, manipulating binaries in an automated fashion to evade malware classification without changing functionality is non-trivial. In this work, we propose a new approach to include adversarial examples in the code section of binaries via instrumentation. The introduced gadgets allow for the inclusion of arbitrary bytes, enabling efficient adversarial attacks that reliably bypass state-of-the-art machine learning classifiers such as the CNN-based Minos recently proposed at NDSS 2021. We analyze the cost and reliability of instrumentation-based adversarial example generation and show that the approach works reliably at minimal size and performance overheads.","PeriodicalId":268358,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment","volume":"101 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Conference on Detection of intrusions and malware, and vulnerability assessment","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2305.02559","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

WebAssembly (Wasm) is a low-level binary format for web applications, which has found widespread adoption due to its improved performance and compatibility with existing software. However, the popularity of Wasm has also led to its exploitation for malicious purposes, such as cryptojacking, where malicious actors use a victim's computing resources to mine cryptocurrencies without their consent. To counteract this threat, machine learning-based detection methods aiming to identify cryptojacking activities within Wasm code have emerged. It is well-known that neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks, where inputs to a classifier are perturbed with minimal changes that result in a crass misclassification. While applying changes in image classification is easy, manipulating binaries in an automated fashion to evade malware classification without changing functionality is non-trivial. In this work, we propose a new approach to include adversarial examples in the code section of binaries via instrumentation. The introduced gadgets allow for the inclusion of arbitrary bytes, enabling efficient adversarial attacks that reliably bypass state-of-the-art machine learning classifiers such as the CNN-based Minos recently proposed at NDSS 2021. We analyze the cost and reliability of instrumentation-based adversarial example generation and show that the approach works reliably at minimal size and performance overheads.
Madvex:机器学习恶意软件检测中基于仪器的对抗性攻击
WebAssembly (Wasm)是一种用于web应用程序的低级二进制格式,由于其改进的性能和与现有软件的兼容性,它已被广泛采用。然而,Wasm的流行也导致其被恶意利用,例如加密劫持,恶意行为者在未经受害者同意的情况下使用受害者的计算资源来挖掘加密货币。为了对抗这种威胁,基于机器学习的检测方法已经出现,旨在识别Wasm代码中的加密劫持活动。众所周知,神经网络容易受到对抗性攻击,其中分类器的输入受到最小变化的干扰,从而导致严重的错误分类。虽然在图像分类中应用更改很容易,但在不更改功能的情况下以自动方式操作二进制文件以逃避恶意软件分类却很重要。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种新的方法,通过插装在二进制文件的代码部分中包含对抗性示例。引入的小工具允许包含任意字节,从而实现有效的对抗式攻击,可靠地绕过最先进的机器学习分类器,例如最近在NDSS 2021上提出的基于cnn的Minos。我们分析了基于仪器的对抗示例生成的成本和可靠性,并表明该方法在最小的尺寸和性能开销下可靠地工作。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信