Michael Lackner, Reinhard Berlach, R. Weiss, C. Steger
{"title":"Countering type confusion and buffer overflow attacks on Java smart cards by data type sensitive obfuscation","authors":"Michael Lackner, Reinhard Berlach, R. Weiss, C. Steger","doi":"10.1145/2556315.2556317","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Java enabled smart cards protect security-related code and data by a sandbox concept. Unfortunately, this sandbox can be bypassed by fault attacks. Therefore, there is a substantial need for transparent, effective, and low-overhead countermeasures. This work demonstrates a new countermeasure against type confusion and buffer overflow attacks. This new countermeasure is based on obfuscating the security critical calculation parts of a virtual machine by secret keys. This countermeasure was integrated into a Java Card virtual machine running on a smart card prototype. New hardware features were added to this prototype to accelerate the obfuscating operation. The execution time overhead of the new countermeasure is demonstrated by performing run-time measurements on the prototype.","PeriodicalId":153749,"journal":{"name":"CS2 '14","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CS2 '14","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2556315.2556317","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
Java enabled smart cards protect security-related code and data by a sandbox concept. Unfortunately, this sandbox can be bypassed by fault attacks. Therefore, there is a substantial need for transparent, effective, and low-overhead countermeasures. This work demonstrates a new countermeasure against type confusion and buffer overflow attacks. This new countermeasure is based on obfuscating the security critical calculation parts of a virtual machine by secret keys. This countermeasure was integrated into a Java Card virtual machine running on a smart card prototype. New hardware features were added to this prototype to accelerate the obfuscating operation. The execution time overhead of the new countermeasure is demonstrated by performing run-time measurements on the prototype.