Science Advice as an Honest Broker: A Case Study of the National Clinical Committee for Infectious Diseases

Abstract

Politics or policy-making(administration) system tends to transfer decision-making functions to science in modern societies with increasing uncertain complexity. This tendency confines scientific discussion in extreme polarisation, which is tightly coupled to political win-lose. As science is more tightly coupled to politics and policy, the degree of freedom for each system is lowered, narrowing the room where policy alternatives are discussed and compromised. Under this analysis, the research proposes the honest broker model as an appropriate role model for scientific advisors in a modern society where uncertainty and value conflicts are growing. Scientific advisors do not prepare a single policy answer but rather present a variety of feasible scenarios and multiple policy alternatives within the scope of uncertainty. For scientific advisory to function as an honest intermediary, certain normative principles such as accountability separation between policy-making and scientific advisory system, transparency, diversity and openness should be established first. Finally, this paper attempts to apply the theoretical discussions to an institutional reformation of the current National Clinical Committee for Infectious Diseases. In this regard, the most urgent issue in the future is to institutionalize the science advice process. Such institutional settings enhance the influence of scientific advisory on policy while preventing the situation in which scientists are accused of political or legal responsibility for policy failure.