Systemic Usury and the European Consumer Credit Directive

Doris Neuberger, U. Reifner
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Usury is a frequent occurrence in consumer credit markets and particularly affects low-income households. Although the term usury conjures images of a greedy individual consciously acting to exploit the weak bargaining position of another by deceitful and even fraudulent means, we consider it as a systemic issue: as a problem of social discrimination, where belonging to a group which is statistically discriminated against leads to entrapment in a chain of usurious credit and financial contracts. This paper reviews the economic rationale for usury legislation and evaluates the European Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC in this context. It identifies systemic usury as the product of market failure: the most powerful explanations for which are monopoly power, where the consumer is locked in a bilateral credit relationship; discrimination through risk-based pricing, and negative externalities. Contrary to the main focus of the European Consumer Credit Directive, improved disclosure of contract terms and other relevant information to consumers at the point of contracting cannot address systemic usury in credit markets. Even fully informed consumers can be discriminated against and become trapped in a situation of bilateral monopoly. As a consequence, the Directive is found to be ineffective: it implicitly acknowledges usurious practices and products as legal and undermines the national fight against usury. The Directive must be reformed.
系统性高利贷和欧洲消费者信贷指令
高利贷是消费信贷市场中经常发生的现象,对低收入家庭的影响尤为严重。尽管“高利贷”一词让人联想到贪婪的个人有意识地通过欺骗甚至欺诈手段利用他人的弱势议价地位,但我们认为这是一个系统性问题:作为一个社会歧视问题,属于一个在统计上受到歧视的群体会导致陷入高利贷和金融合同链。本文回顾了高利贷立法的经济原理,并在此背景下评估了欧洲消费者信贷指令2008/48/EC。它将系统性高利贷认定为市场失灵的产物:对此最有力的解释是垄断力量,即消费者被锁定在双边信贷关系中;基于风险定价的歧视,以及负外部性。与欧洲消费者信贷指令的主要关注点相反,在订立合同时向消费者披露合同条款和其他相关信息并不能解决信贷市场中的系统性高利贷问题。即使是充分知情的消费者也可能受到歧视,陷入双边垄断的境地。因此,该指令被认为是无效的:它含蓄地承认高利贷的做法和产品是合法的,破坏了国家打击高利贷的斗争。该指令必须进行改革。
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