{"title":"Alienation in the AI-Driven Workplace","authors":"Kate Vredenburgh","doi":"10.1145/3461702.3462520","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper asks whether explanations of one's workplace and economic institutions are valuable in and of themselves. In doing so, it departs from much of the explainability literature in law, computer science, philosophy, and the social sciences, which examine the instrumental values that explainable AI has: explainable systems increase accountability and user trust, or reduce the risk of harm due to increased robustness. Think, however, of how you might feel if you went to your local administrative agency to apply for some benefit, or you were handed down a decision by a judge in a court. Let's stipulate that you know that the decision was just, even though neither the civil servant nor the judge explain to you why the decision was made, and you don't know the relevant rules; you just brought all the information you had about yourself, and hoped for the best. Is such a decision process defective? I argue that such a decision process is defective because it prevents individuals from accessing the normative explanations that are necessary to form an appropriate practical orientation towards their social world. A practical orientation is a reflective stance towards one's social world, which is expressed in one's actions and draws on one's cognitive architecture that allows one to navigate the various social practices and institutions. A practical orientation can range from rejection to silent endorsement, and is the sort of attitude for which there are the right kind of reasons, based in the world's normative character. It also determines how one fills out one's role obligations, and, more broadly, guides one's actions in the relevant institution: a teacher in the American South during the time of enforced racial segregation, for example, might choose where to teach on the basis of her rejection of the segregation of education. To form an appropriate practical orientation, one must have an understanding of the social world's normative character, which required a normative explanation And, since we spend so much of our lives at work and are constrained by economic institutions, we must understand their structure and how they function.","PeriodicalId":197336,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462520","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This paper asks whether explanations of one's workplace and economic institutions are valuable in and of themselves. In doing so, it departs from much of the explainability literature in law, computer science, philosophy, and the social sciences, which examine the instrumental values that explainable AI has: explainable systems increase accountability and user trust, or reduce the risk of harm due to increased robustness. Think, however, of how you might feel if you went to your local administrative agency to apply for some benefit, or you were handed down a decision by a judge in a court. Let's stipulate that you know that the decision was just, even though neither the civil servant nor the judge explain to you why the decision was made, and you don't know the relevant rules; you just brought all the information you had about yourself, and hoped for the best. Is such a decision process defective? I argue that such a decision process is defective because it prevents individuals from accessing the normative explanations that are necessary to form an appropriate practical orientation towards their social world. A practical orientation is a reflective stance towards one's social world, which is expressed in one's actions and draws on one's cognitive architecture that allows one to navigate the various social practices and institutions. A practical orientation can range from rejection to silent endorsement, and is the sort of attitude for which there are the right kind of reasons, based in the world's normative character. It also determines how one fills out one's role obligations, and, more broadly, guides one's actions in the relevant institution: a teacher in the American South during the time of enforced racial segregation, for example, might choose where to teach on the basis of her rejection of the segregation of education. To form an appropriate practical orientation, one must have an understanding of the social world's normative character, which required a normative explanation And, since we spend so much of our lives at work and are constrained by economic institutions, we must understand their structure and how they function.