Axiomatization allocation of emission allowances in power systems considering bounded rationality strategic voting

Abstract

Both in theory and practice show that in the initial stage of power system carbon emission market construction, the free allocation of initial carbon emission allowance is the best choice. In practical situations, a variety of equity principles have been applied in different allocation problems, however, conflicts always exist among these principles. It is necessary to coordinate different allocation schemes. Meanwhile, voting is an effective mechanism to solve the conflicts. In this paper, the voting allocation model is presented, and the voting mechanism is introduced to solve the uniformity and effectiveness problem of the allocation method. Since strategic behaviors exist in the iterated voting allocation, it may not be the optimal strategy to only consider the current allocation scheme. To overcome this problem, game strategy is studied in this paper, and the bounded rationality of participants in complicated situations is described by "Local optimization" and "Greedy algorithm". Based on this, the games equilibrium is investigated for the problem with less than four strategies, by introducing the strict preference ordering list, and a series of theorems are obtained. Finally, the actual case studies are carried out to shown that the algorithms in this paper satisfy the main principles of equity, and can be accepted by all the participants.