Incentivization schemes for vehicle allocation in one-way vehicle sharing systems

Abstract

The major operational problem in one-way vehicle sharing systems is the vehicle stock imbalance problem. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing a new approach for dynamically allocating vehicles to users based on “incentivization” schemes which use reservations to coordinate supply-and-demand mismatches and price incentives for rewarding users, if they accept to pick up their vehicle from an oversupplied station and/or to drop off it to an under-supplied station. The system incentivizes users based on the priorities of vehicle relocations from station to station, taking into account the fluctuating demand for vehicles and parking places at different stations over time. We present two different schemes for incentivizing users to act in favour of the system. Both schemes consider budget constraints and are truthful and budget-feasible. We extensively evaluated our approach through simulations and observed significant improvements in the number of completed trips and system revenue.