Some Observations about SOX 404(b) Control Process Audits

William R. Kinney, Jr., R. Martin, Marcy L. Shepardson
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

In the decade since the July, 2002 passage of the quickly-legislated Sarbanes-Oxley Act, audit production in the U.S. has been substantially augmented by implementation of mandated internal control process audits. Audit production changes are important as the control audit mandate is unique and imposes substantial costs on U.S.-traded firms, yet little is known about the conduct of control process audits or the efficacy of substantially lower cost alternative mechanisms to provide auditor scrutiny and reporting on internal control quality. This paper reflects our collective experiences and observation of a consistent message across the decade from analyses of extensive public and limited non-public archival data, analytical studies, and numerous personal experiences of audit practitioners. Our primary observation is that, absent knowledge of any financial misstatements, auditors find it difficult to identify material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting. Conversely, with knowledge of misstatements, auditors can and do identify, at low incremental cost, most entities that have ineffective internal controls as identified by control audits. Financial misstatement detection is, of course, the primary tangible output of a financial statement audit. Thus, it appears possible to exploit this observation to obtain for investors information about companies with weak controls without incurring the cost of a full internal control process audit. We believe that U.S. markets could benefit from more transparency about the current U.S. audit production process and from informed debate about the best mechanism design for balancing the needs of all parties interested in internal control quality disclosure.
关于SOX 404(b)控制过程审计的一些看法
自2002年7月迅速通过《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act)以来的十年里,由于强制实施内部控制流程审计,美国的审计生产得到了实质性的扩大。审计生产的变化是重要的,因为控制审计任务是独特的,对在美国上市的公司施加了巨大的成本,但对控制过程审计的实施或提供审计审查和内部控制质量报告的低成本替代机制的有效性知之甚少。本文反映了我们的集体经验和对十年来一致信息的观察,这些信息来自对广泛的公开和有限的非公开档案数据、分析研究和审计从业人员的许多个人经验的分析。我们的主要观察是,在不了解任何财务错报的情况下,审计师发现很难识别财务报告内部控制的重大缺陷。相反,通过对错报的了解,审计员能够并且确实以较低的增量成本,识别出控制审计所识别的大多数具有无效内部控制的实体。当然,财务错报检测是财务报表审计的主要有形产出。因此,似乎有可能利用这一观察结果,为投资者获取有关控制薄弱的公司的信息,而无需承担全面内部控制过程审计的成本。我们相信,美国市场将受益于当前美国审计生产流程的更多透明度,以及关于平衡内部控制质量披露各方需求的最佳机制设计的知情辩论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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