Impact of different auction mechanisms in the carbon emission auction market on the electricity market

Qiang Wang, Daoqiang Li, Wei Wang, Kai Yuan, Xuepan Tang, Tianran Li
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Abstract

Carbon emission trading mechanism is considered as one of the most effective tools to control carbon emissions. In this paper, the initial auction proportion of carbon emission trading (CET) market is designed, and the uniform-price auction and the discriminatory-price auction are considered, and a multi-agent simulation model of the interaction between CET market and electricity market is constructed. The simulation results show that with the increase of the auction proportion in the primary CET market, the electricity price in the electricity market keeps rising, and the discriminatory-price auction is more suitable for China's national conditions. The discriminatory-price auction can stimulate the enthusiasm of power generation firms to participate in carbon trading, and enable the government to obtain higher revenue. At the same time, the discriminatory-price auction has a more violent emission reduction effect.
碳排放拍卖市场中不同拍卖机制对电力市场的影响
碳排放权交易机制被认为是控制碳排放最有效的工具之一。本文设计了碳排放交易(CET)市场的初始拍卖比例,考虑了均价拍卖和差别定价拍卖,构建了碳排放交易市场与电力市场相互作用的多智能体仿真模型。仿真结果表明,随着一级电力市场拍卖比例的增加,电力市场电价不断上升,差别定价拍卖更适合中国国情。差别定价拍卖可以激发发电企业参与碳交易的积极性,使政府获得更高的收益。同时,差别定价拍卖的减排效果更为剧烈。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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