{"title":"Better Than Advertised: Improved Collision-Resistance Guarantees for MD-Based Hash Functions","authors":"M. Bellare, Joseph Jaeger, Julia Len","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134087","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The MD transform that underlies the MD and SHA families iterates a compression function h to get a hash function H. The question we ask is, what property X of h guarantees collision resistance (CR) of H? The classical answer is that X itself be CR. We show that weaker conditions X, in particular forms of what we call constrained-CR, suffice. This reduces demands on compression functions, to the benefit of security, and also, forensically, explains why collision-finding attacks on compression functions have not, historically, lead to immediate breaks of the corresponding hash functions. We obtain our results via a definitional framework called RS security, and a parameterized treatment of MD, that also serve to unify prior work and variants of the transform.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134087","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
The MD transform that underlies the MD and SHA families iterates a compression function h to get a hash function H. The question we ask is, what property X of h guarantees collision resistance (CR) of H? The classical answer is that X itself be CR. We show that weaker conditions X, in particular forms of what we call constrained-CR, suffice. This reduces demands on compression functions, to the benefit of security, and also, forensically, explains why collision-finding attacks on compression functions have not, historically, lead to immediate breaks of the corresponding hash functions. We obtain our results via a definitional framework called RS security, and a parameterized treatment of MD, that also serve to unify prior work and variants of the transform.