{"title":"Dime qué armas y te diré qué eres. Construcción de coaliciones en Argentina, 1995-2015","authors":"F. Cruz","doi":"10.46468/rsaap.13.2.a3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolLa dinamica competitiva argentina ha adquirido un componente coalicional en las ultimas dos decadas. Con posterioridad a la reforma constitucional de 1994, cada vez mas partidos politicos privilegian la formacion de acuerdos conjuntos con distintos socios para competir por cargos publicos en juego. El presente trabajo tiene por objeto plantear que la construccion de coaliciones electorales es una decision estrategica de las elites partidarias. Pueden privilegiar dos modelos distintos de construccion: hacerlo por penetracion territorial o por difusion territorial. El modelo privilegiado guarda relacion con el grado de acuerdo electoral que alcanzan las elites partidarias. Aplico este analisis a las coaliciones presidenciales y de diputados nacionales que compitieron en el pais entre 1995 y 2015 EnglishArgentina’s competitive dynamic has acquired a coalitional component in the last two decades. After the constitutional reform of 1994, more and more political parties privilege the formation of joint agreements with different partners to compete for public office at stake. The present work aims to propose that the construction of electoral coalitions is a strategic decision of the party elites. They can privilege two different models of construction: doing it by territorial penetration or by territorial diffusion. The privileged model impacts on the degree of electoral agreement reached by party elites. I apply this analysis to the presidential coalitions and national deputies that competed in the country between 1995 and 2015","PeriodicalId":266034,"journal":{"name":"REVISTA SAAP","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"REVISTA SAAP","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46468/rsaap.13.2.a3","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
espanolLa dinamica competitiva argentina ha adquirido un componente coalicional en las ultimas dos decadas. Con posterioridad a la reforma constitucional de 1994, cada vez mas partidos politicos privilegian la formacion de acuerdos conjuntos con distintos socios para competir por cargos publicos en juego. El presente trabajo tiene por objeto plantear que la construccion de coaliciones electorales es una decision estrategica de las elites partidarias. Pueden privilegiar dos modelos distintos de construccion: hacerlo por penetracion territorial o por difusion territorial. El modelo privilegiado guarda relacion con el grado de acuerdo electoral que alcanzan las elites partidarias. Aplico este analisis a las coaliciones presidenciales y de diputados nacionales que compitieron en el pais entre 1995 y 2015 EnglishArgentina’s competitive dynamic has acquired a coalitional component in the last two decades. After the constitutional reform of 1994, more and more political parties privilege the formation of joint agreements with different partners to compete for public office at stake. The present work aims to propose that the construction of electoral coalitions is a strategic decision of the party elites. They can privilege two different models of construction: doing it by territorial penetration or by territorial diffusion. The privileged model impacts on the degree of electoral agreement reached by party elites. I apply this analysis to the presidential coalitions and national deputies that competed in the country between 1995 and 2015