Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity

John C. Coates, IV, T. Lincoln
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引用次数: 6

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision to let corporations spend unlimited sums in federal elections was premised on a pair of promises: Corporations would disclose expenditures, and shareholders would police such spending. Those promises remain unfulfilled: of $266 million spent by outside groups in 2010, half was spent by groups that revealed nothing about their funders, double the total spending by outside groups in 2006. The best chance to fulfill those promises may now rest with the SEC. Contrary to consensus views, SEC action may benefit owners of affected firms. We estimate industry-adjusted price-to-book ratios of 80 companies in the S&P 500 that have policies calling for disclosure of electioneering. After controlling for size, leverage, research and development, growth and political activity, we find disclosing companies had 7.5 percent higher ratios than other S&P 500 companies in 2010. Our data are inconsistent with claims that disclosure is harmful, and are consistent with the idea that well-managed companies responsive to shareholder concerns tend to be valued more highly than other companies.
履行肯尼迪的承诺:为什么证交会应该强制披露公司政治活动
最高法院“联合公民”(Citizens United)案允许企业在联邦选举中无限制支出的决定,是以两项承诺为前提的:企业将披露支出,股东将监督此类支出。这些承诺至今仍未兑现:2010年外部团体花费的2.66亿美元中,有一半是由对其资助者一无所知的团体花费的,是2006年外部团体总支出的两倍。实现这些承诺的最佳机会现在可能取决于SEC。与普遍观点相反,SEC的行动可能会使受影响公司的所有者受益。我们对标准普尔500指数中有80家公司进行了行业调整后的市净率估算,这些公司的政策要求披露竞选活动。在控制了规模、杠杆、研发、增长和政治活动后,我们发现,2010年,披露公司的比率比其他标准普尔500指数公司高7.5%。我们的数据与披露有害的说法不一致,却与管理良好、对股东关切做出回应的公司往往比其他公司估值更高的观点一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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