A Three-party Repeated Game Model for Data Privacy in Mobile Edge Crowdsensing of IoT

Abstract

The low request response delay of mobile edge crowdsensing (MECS) paradigm allows quick interactions among entities in practical scenarios. However, there often exist dishonest behaviors in such interactions, and the personal information leakage involved seriously threatens the privacy and security of sensing users. To tackle this problem, previously we had proposed a three-party game model, though lacking the consideration of multiple interactions in the actual scenario. Based on game theory, this research therefore proposes a three-party repeated game model. Specifically, we propose the corresponding social norms for different phases of sensing data. It analyzes all possible behaviors deviating from rationality, calculates the change of corresponding payoff function, and explores the influencing factors and constraints of players' honest behaviors based on the premise of maximizing interests. Finally, a significant number of simulations and numerical analysis indicate that the proposed model is feasible and effective in maximizing the benefits of game participants.