Countering Informational Influences of the Russian Federation: National Experience

Vitaly Khodanovych
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Abstract

The urgency of the chosen issue is due to the fact that since the beginning of the hybrid aggression in 2014, the domestic information space has been subject to various interventions from Russia: from biased Russian media coverage of events in Ukraine to outright lies from the Russian authorities. At the same time, such attention to our state by Russia has led to the formation in Ukrainian society of a certain level of resistance to hostile information influences and the acquisition by domestic state and public institutions, as well as scientific circles of unique experience in countering Russia in this area. The methods of counteraction developed so far are quite diverse in nature, and therefore require critical evaluation in order to improve the foundations of information security of both Ukraine and the world democratic community. The purpose of this article is to assess the state of information security of the nation and to determine further directions for its improvement on the basis of a retrospective analysis of the process of counteracting Russian information influences on Ukrainian society and the state. Reflective approach was chosen as the main one to study the national experience of counteracting the information influences of the Russian Federation, as it provides an opportunity to comprehend Ukraine's experience as a purposeful and organized process of strengthening the resilience of domestic state and public institutions to clearly planned multilevel aggression and creation of the foundations for the development of own information space. A comparison of main information operations of the Russian Federation targeting Ukraine, of the described in the article stages of Russian aggression with the measures taken by the Ukrainian state and society gives an opportunity to allege that the crisis stage in the information struggle and the formation of domestic sovereign information space as a phenomenon is over. So, if at the early stages of information aggression the Kremlin relied on the attractiveness of its civilizational concepts, such as "Russian World" or "Moscow - Third Rome", which should have led to Russia's victory by "soft power", today we observe the change of course towards cluster influences, tendencies (problems in the Ukrainian energy sector, "anti-vaccination" campaigns, etc.) aimed at destabilizing the domestic political situation in the country and bringing discord in relations with foreign partners. Currently, the information campaigns of the Russian Federation from an individual phenomenon (operational line of hybrid war) have been transformed into secondary (service) tool of other areas of aggression: military, economic, etc. Under the difficult conditions of multifaceted opposition to the aggressor, Ukraine managed to create a basis for the development of its own information space and its protection from unfriendly influences not only of Russia but also of other potentially interested geopolitical actors. At the same time, both the state and society need to focus on further development of their own system of counteraction - to improve existing legislation, build appropriate institutions, form a scientific and methodological basis for the use of adequate and possibly asymmetric means of counteracting Russia.
抵制俄罗斯联邦的信息影响:国家经验
选择这个问题的紧迫性是由于这样一个事实,即自2014年混合侵略开始以来,国内信息空间一直受到俄罗斯的各种干预:从俄罗斯媒体对乌克兰事件的有偏见的报道到俄罗斯当局的彻头彻尾的谎言。同时,俄罗斯对我们国家的这种关注导致乌克兰社会对敌对信息影响形成了一定程度的抵抗,国内国家和公共机构以及科学界获得了在这一领域对抗俄罗斯的独特经验。迄今为止制定的对抗方法在性质上相当多样化,因此需要进行批判性评价,以便改善乌克兰和世界民主社会的信息安全基础。本文的目的是评估国家的信息安全状况,并在回顾分析对抗俄罗斯信息对乌克兰社会和国家影响的过程的基础上,确定进一步的改进方向。选择反思方法作为研究抵制俄罗斯联邦信息影响的国家经验的主要方法,因为它提供了一个机会,可以理解乌克兰的经验是一个有目的和有组织的过程,旨在加强国内国家和公共机构对明确规划的多层次侵略的抵御能力,并为发展自己的信息空间奠定基础。将俄罗斯针对乌克兰的主要信息行动与文章中描述的俄罗斯侵略阶段与乌克兰国家和社会采取的措施进行比较,可以断言,信息斗争的危机阶段和国内主权信息空间的形成作为一种现象已经结束。因此,如果说在信息侵略的早期阶段,克里姆林宫依赖于其文明概念的吸引力,如“俄罗斯世界”或“莫斯科-第三罗马”,这些概念本应通过“软实力”导致俄罗斯的胜利,那么今天,我们观察到朝着集群影响、趋势(乌克兰能源部门的问题、“反疫苗”运动、等),目的是破坏国内政治局势的稳定,挑拨与外国伙伴的关系。目前,俄罗斯联邦的信息战已经从单个现象(混合战争的作战路线)转变为其他侵略领域的次要(服务)工具:在多方面反对侵略者的困难条件下,乌克兰设法为发展自己的信息空间和保护自己免受不友好的影响奠定了基础,这些影响不仅来自俄罗斯,也来自其他可能感兴趣的地缘政治参与者。与此同时,国家和社会都需要把重点放在进一步发展自己的对抗体系上——完善现有立法,建立适当的制度,为使用适当的、可能不对称的手段对抗俄罗斯形成科学和方法论的基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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