The Roots of Executive Power

Abstract

How do America's chief executives get what they want out of the legislative process when their only formal power comes when bills arrive on their desks? We argue that executives are often able to get what they want by using their veto pen as a positive power and by relying upon a variety of additional carrots and sticks. We illustrate the logic of our argument by adapting Romer and Rosenthals's (1978) "setter model." We explain the intuition behind our model using case studies and interviews with politicians and advisors who have participated in inter-branch negotiations. To test our model's predictions about the determinants of gubernatorial success we have compiled a dataset of gubernatorial proposals from 52 State of the State addresses delivered in 27 states over two recent legislative sessions. We gauge success by asking whether legislators eventually passed what governors proposed, either in its original form or in "half-a-loaf" compromises. We supplement this data with institutional and political variables. Overall we show that governors get either most or some of what they want on over 50 percent of their legislative proposals. We also demonstrate that variation in success is often shaped by the governors' policy preferences, veto powers, popularity, and time remaining in office.