European Banking Union and the EU Single Financial Market: More Differentiated Integration, or Disintegration?

Eilís Ferran
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引用次数: 20

Abstract

European Banking Union (EBU) provides an important new context in which to examine how differentiation affects integration. This chapter considers: (1) the short to medium term appeal of EBU participation for Member States that do not use the euro (centripetal effects); and (ii) the potential over the same time horizon for EBU to lead to disorderly break-up of the EU (centrifugal effects). On (1), EBU pushes the boundaries of legal technology with a view to maximising the functional equivalence between euro Member States, whose participation is compulsory, and the non-euro Member States that choose to participate in EBU via a close cooperation agreement. The early indications that some non-euro Member States do want to join EBU notwithstanding certain lingering differences between their position and that of euro area Member States provide an encouraging sign as to the value of those efforts. But whilst fair participation terms are necessary, they are not a sufficient precondition to the exercise of the option to participate in EBU. Each non-euro Member State will make its own wide-ranging political calculations on whether there are net welfare gains from EBU and in doing so will take due account of the policy preferences of private and public stakeholders, which may pull in different directions. The full extent of the centripetal effect of EBU is therefore hard to predict but it is certainly a new force to be reckoned with. On (2), the chapter reaches a cautiously optimistic prognosis. The legal safeguards in EBU to address disintegration risks are not a permanent solution to the problem of certain Member States being intent upon remaining outside deeper integration in the monetary and economic sphere but nor are they merely fleeting or stopgap measures. The chapter identifies compelling economic incentives for all Member States to make these safeguards work and to resist destructive behaviour.
欧洲银行联盟和欧盟单一金融市场:更加差异化的整合,还是解体?
欧洲银行业联盟(EBU)为研究差异化如何影响一体化提供了一个重要的新背景。本章考虑:(1)欧洲货币联盟参与对不使用欧元的成员国的中短期吸引力(向心效应);(ii)欧盟在同一时间范围内导致欧盟无序解体的可能性(离心效应)。在(1)上,EBU推动了法律技术的界限,以期最大限度地实现强制性参与的欧元区成员国与通过密切合作协议选择参与EBU的非欧元区成员国之间的功能对等。早期的迹象表明,一些非欧元成员国确实希望加入欧洲货币联盟,尽管它们的立场与欧元区成员国的立场之间存在着某些挥之不去的差异,这是一个令人鼓舞的迹象,表明这些努力的价值。但是,虽然公平参与条款是必要的,但它们并不是行使参与EBU期权的充分先决条件。每一个非欧元区成员国都将对EBU是否有净福利收益做出自己广泛的政治计算,并在此过程中适当考虑私人和公共利益相关者的政策偏好,这可能会导致不同的方向。因此,EBU的向心力效应的全面程度很难预测,但它肯定是一股不容忽视的新力量。在(2)上,本章做出了谨慎乐观的预测。欧洲货币联盟应对解体风险的法律保障措施并不能永久解决某些成员国有意留在货币和经济领域更深层次一体化之外的问题,但它们也不仅仅是短暂的或权宜之计。本章确定了所有会员国使这些保障措施发挥作用和抵制破坏性行为的强有力的经济激励。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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