Board Independence, Family Control and Earnings Management-Based on empirical research on listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets

Zikai Yan, Chiyuan Xiao, Bufan Wang, Qianyu Zhou, Yanping Liu
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Abstract

In the research on the impact of board independence on corporate earnings management, few existing literatures discuss the impact of family control on the relationship between the two. Based on the panel data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2015 to 2019, this paper aims to empirically analyze the impact of board independence on corporate earnings management, and explores the moderating effect of family enterprise and corporate family control on each impact path. The main conclusions are as follows: the increase of the proportion of independent directors to the total number of directors does not affect the accrued earnings management, but promotes the degree of real earnings management behavior, and the two-duty separation of chairman and CEO can effectively inhibit the occurrence of the two types of earnings management. In family firms, the influence of the proportion of independent directors on real earnings management is limited, and the moderating effect of this inhibition is more significant with the increase of corporate family control. The research conclusions of this paper provide reference for the study of the relationship between board independence, family control and earnings management, and provide suggestions for the innovation of corporate governance mechanism and supervision system.
董事会独立、家族控制与盈余管理——基于沪深上市公司的实证研究
在董事会独立性对公司盈余管理影响的研究中,现有文献很少讨论家族控制对两者关系的影响。本文基于2015 - 2019年沪深上市公司面板数据,实证分析董事会独立性对公司盈余管理的影响,并探讨家族企业和企业家族控制在各影响路径上的调节作用。主要结论如下:独立董事占董事总数比例的提高并不影响应计盈余管理,反而促进了真实盈余管理行为的程度,董事长与CEO两职分离可以有效抑制两种盈余管理的发生。在家族企业中,独立董事比例对真实盈余管理的影响是有限的,并且随着企业家族控制的增加,这种抑制的调节作用更加显著。本文的研究结论为研究董事会独立、家族控制与盈余管理之间的关系提供了参考,并为公司治理机制和监督体制的创新提供了建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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