ThreadLock: Native Principal Isolation Through Memory Protection Keys

William Blair, Wil Robertson, Manuel Egele
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Abstract

Inter-process isolation has been deployed in operating systems for decades, but secure intra-process isolation remains an active research topic. Achieving secure intra-process isolation within an operating system process is notoriously difficult. However, viable solutions that securely consolidate workloads into the same process have the potential to be extremely valuable. In this work, we present native principal isolation, a technique to restrict threads’ access to process memory by enforcing intra-process security policies defined over a program’s application binary interface (ABI). A separate memory protection mechanism then enforces these policies. We present ThreadLock, a system that enforces native principal isolation policies using memory protection keys (MPKs) present on recent Intel CPUs. We demonstrate that ThreadLock efficiently restricts access to both thread-local data and sensitive information present in real workloads. We show how ThreadLock protects data within 3 real world applications, including the Apache web server, Redis in-memory data store, and MySQL relational database management system (RDBMS) with little performance overhead (+1.06% in the worst case). Furthermore, we show ThreadLock stops real world attacks against these popular programs. Our results show that native principal isolation is expressive enough to define effective intra-process security policies for real programs and that these policies may be enforced using MPKs without requiring any change to a program’s source or binary.
线程锁:本机主体隔离通过内存保护键
进程间隔离已经在操作系统中部署了几十年,但安全的进程内隔离仍然是一个活跃的研究课题。在操作系统进程中实现安全的进程内隔离是非常困难的。但是,将工作负载安全地整合到同一进程中的可行解决方案可能非常有价值。在这项工作中,我们介绍了本机主体隔离,这是一种通过强制在程序的应用程序二进制接口(ABI)上定义的进程内安全策略来限制线程访问进程内存的技术。然后一个单独的内存保护机制执行这些策略。我们提出ThreadLock,一个使用内存保护键(mpk)强制本地主体隔离策略的系统。我们证明ThreadLock有效地限制了对线程本地数据和实际工作负载中存在的敏感信息的访问。我们展示了ThreadLock如何在3个实际应用程序中保护数据,包括Apache web服务器,Redis内存数据存储和MySQL关系数据库管理系统(RDBMS),性能开销很小(最坏情况下+1.06%)。此外,我们还展示了ThreadLock可以阻止现实世界中针对这些流行程序的攻击。我们的结果表明,本机主体隔离具有足够的表达能力,可以为实际程序定义有效的进程内安全策略,并且可以使用mpk强制执行这些策略,而无需对程序的源代码或二进制文件进行任何更改。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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