LaChouTi: kernel vulnerability responding framework for the fragmented Android devices

Jingzheng Wu, Mutian Yang
{"title":"LaChouTi: kernel vulnerability responding framework for the fragmented Android devices","authors":"Jingzheng Wu, Mutian Yang","doi":"10.1145/3106237.3117768","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The most criticized problem in the Android ecosystem is fragmentation, i.e., 24,093 Android devices in the wild are made by 1,294 manufacturers and installed with extremely customized operating systems. The existence of so many different active versions of Android makes security updates and vulnerability responses across the whole range of Android devices difficult. In this paper, we seek to respond to the unpatched kernel vulnerabilities for the fragmented Android devices. Specifically, we propose and implement LaChouTi, which is an automated kernel security update framework consisting of cloud service and end application update. LaChouTi first tracks and identifies the exposed vulnerabilities according to the CVE-Patch map for the target Android kernels. Then, it generates differential binary patches for the identified results. Finally, it pushes and applies the patches to the kernels. We evaluate LaChouTi using 12 Nexus Android devices that have different Android versions, different kernel versions, different series and different manufacturers, and find 1922 unpatched kernel vulnerabilities in these devices. The results show that: (1) the security risk of unpatched vulnerabilities caused by fragmentation is serious; and (2) the proposed LaChouTi is effective in responding to such security risk. Finally, we implement LaChouTi on new commercial devices by collaborating with four internationally renowned manufacturers. The results demonstrate that LaChouTi is effective for the manufacturers'security updates.","PeriodicalId":313494,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2017 11th Joint Meeting on Foundations of Software Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3106237.3117768","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

Abstract

The most criticized problem in the Android ecosystem is fragmentation, i.e., 24,093 Android devices in the wild are made by 1,294 manufacturers and installed with extremely customized operating systems. The existence of so many different active versions of Android makes security updates and vulnerability responses across the whole range of Android devices difficult. In this paper, we seek to respond to the unpatched kernel vulnerabilities for the fragmented Android devices. Specifically, we propose and implement LaChouTi, which is an automated kernel security update framework consisting of cloud service and end application update. LaChouTi first tracks and identifies the exposed vulnerabilities according to the CVE-Patch map for the target Android kernels. Then, it generates differential binary patches for the identified results. Finally, it pushes and applies the patches to the kernels. We evaluate LaChouTi using 12 Nexus Android devices that have different Android versions, different kernel versions, different series and different manufacturers, and find 1922 unpatched kernel vulnerabilities in these devices. The results show that: (1) the security risk of unpatched vulnerabilities caused by fragmentation is serious; and (2) the proposed LaChouTi is effective in responding to such security risk. Finally, we implement LaChouTi on new commercial devices by collaborating with four internationally renowned manufacturers. The results demonstrate that LaChouTi is effective for the manufacturers'security updates.
LaChouTi:针对碎片化Android设备的内核漏洞响应框架
Android生态系统中最受诟病的问题是碎片化,也就是说,目前有24,093台Android设备由1,294家制造商生产,并安装了高度定制的操作系统。如此多不同的Android活跃版本的存在使得整个Android设备的安全更新和漏洞响应变得困难。在本文中,我们试图对碎片化Android设备未修补的内核漏洞做出回应。具体来说,我们提出并实现了LaChouTi,它是一个由云服务和终端应用程序更新组成的自动化内核安全更新框架。LaChouTi首先根据目标Android内核的CVE-Patch地图跟踪并识别暴露的漏洞。然后,它为识别的结果生成微分二进制补丁。最后,它向内核推送并应用补丁。我们使用12台Nexus Android设备对LaChouTi进行了评估,这些设备拥有不同的Android版本、不同的内核版本、不同的系列和不同的制造商,并在这些设备中发现了1922个未修补的内核漏洞。结果表明:(1)碎片化导致的未修补漏洞安全风险严重;(2)所提出的LaChouTi能够有效应对此类安全风险。最后,我们通过与四家国际知名制造商合作,在新的商用设备上实施LaChouTi。结果表明,LaChouTi对厂商的安全更新是有效的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信