Lee, TerenceDefect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian AsiaBaltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press252 pp., $59.95 hardcoverISBN 978-1421415161Publication Date: January 2015
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Abstract
This solid analytical work highlights the conditions under which militaries in Asian authoritarian regimes have determined or prevented regime change in support of popular demonstrations and why. The author, Terence Lee, is assistant professor of political science at the National University of Singapore and a noted scholar on civil-military relations in Asia. Lee uses two cases of military defection from supporting regimes (Philippines 1986, Indonesia 1998) and two cases of military defense of the state (China 1989, Burma/Myanmar 2007) to support his thesis. He argues that personalistic forms of authoritarian rule tend to lead to military fissures that become ripe for military defection when popular protests erupt. The defectors will support regime change if they can come to an agreement with leaders of the protests. On the other hand, where authoritarian regimes are organized through power-sharing mechanisms that severely reduce personalism, military defection during popular protests becomes less likely (189). In Chapter 1, Lee argues that in the literature on authoritarian transition, the role of military behavior itself in ensuring or preventing moves toward political change has been under-explored. His study fills this void. Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework that highlights the importance of agencydetermined structure, drawing from “new institutionalism” political science literature (22). To engender elite loyalty, many tyrannies establish institutions that deliver balanced levels of carrots and sticks to the regime’s stakeholders. These power-sharing institutions provide information about the actions of regime stakeholders while offering routines designed to diminish moral hazard problems. Examples include autocratic
这本扎实的分析著作强调了亚洲独裁政权的军队决定或阻止政权更迭以支持民众示威的条件及其原因。作者Terence Lee是新加坡国立大学(National University of Singapore)政治学助理教授,也是研究亚洲军民关系的知名学者。李用两个支持政权的军事叛逃案例(菲律宾1986年,印度尼西亚1998年)和两个国家军事防御案例(中国1989年,缅甸/缅甸2007年)来支持他的论文。他认为,个人主义形式的独裁统治往往会导致军队出现裂痕,当民众抗议爆发时,这种裂痕就会为军队叛变提供条件。如果叛逃者能与抗议领导人达成协议,他们将支持政权更迭。另一方面,如果专制政权是通过权力分享机制组织起来的,这种机制严重降低了个人主义,那么在民众抗议期间军队叛逃的可能性就会降低(189)。在第一章中,李认为,在有关威权过渡的文献中,军事行为本身在确保或阻止政治变革方面的作用尚未得到充分探讨。他的研究填补了这一空白。第2章从“新制度主义”政治学文献(22)中提出了一个强调代理决定结构重要性的理论框架。为了培养精英的忠诚度,许多专制政权建立了一些制度,向政权的利益相关者提供均衡水平的胡萝卜和大棒。这些权力分享机构提供了有关政权利益相关者行为的信息,同时提供了旨在减少道德风险问题的惯例。例子包括专制