Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India

Surender Baswana, P. Chakrabarti, S. Chandran, Yashodhan Kanoria, Utkarsh Patange
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引用次数: 56

Abstract

The centrally funded technical institutes (CFTIs) for undergraduate studies in India consist of the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) as well as several non-IITs (the National Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institutes of Information Technology, and others). The IITs use the candidate rankings obtained from performance on the JEE Advanced exam for their admissions, whereas the non-IITs use a different set of rankings (obtained from the JEE Main exam) for their admissions. Until 2014, the IITs and the non-IITs used two separate processes to allocate seats to candidates. Every year, several individual candidates would get two seats, one from each of these processes. As a result, at least one of those two seats would go vacant. This would especially be a problem for the IITs as their allocation process would complete before that of the non-IITs. In 2015, we designed and implemented a new joint (centralized) seat allocation process for undergraduate admissions to over 500 programs spread across 80 CFTIs in India, bringing the IIT and the non-IIT processes together under a single umbrella. Our process asks each candidate to submit a single preference list over all these programs, and allots each candidate at most one seat. Our process is based on the well known Deferred Acceptance algorithm, which produces a fair allocation that respects the candidate rankings. However, complex affirmative action seat reservations led us to make a number of algorithmic innovations, including (i) a carefully constructed heuristic for incorporating non-nested common quotas that span multiple programs, (ii) a method to utilize unfilled reserved seats with no modifications to the core software, and (iii) a robust approach to reduce variability in the number of reserved category candidates admitted, while retaining fairness. Because candidates also have outside options (e.g., attending a privately funded institute, or retaking the entrance exams the following year), and we were not allowed, in anticipation of attrition, to speculatively admit more candidates than the capacity permitted, we resorted to a multi-round seat allocation process. After every round, we ask the candidates to accept their allotted seat (if any) by paying a seat acceptance fee by a deadline. Those who don't vacate their seats, and these seats are subsequently allotted to other candidates in future rounds. We implemented a number of process innovations to make the multi-round process smoother and more efficient. These innovations are described in our full paper \citejournalPaper Our new seat allocation process went live in 2015, and has remained in successful use since, with continuing improvements. The vacancies at the IITs have reduced by nearly 70% (e.g., there were only 198 vacancies in 10,988 seats in 2017, relative to 587 vacancies in 9,784 seats in 2014 under the legacy process). Meanwhile, vacancies in the non-IITs have reduced only slightly, and concern us, though reducing these was outside our initial mandate. In 2017, the non-IITs had 6,510 vacancies in their 25,220 seats, when classes began. Data indicates that almost all these vacancies are avoidable in the sense that there were eligible candidates who want these seats. The key causes of the vacancies at the non-IITs are revealed by our analysis of the admissions data: (i) Candidates who accept a seat are allowed to surrender them until the penultimate round (resulting in a refund of their seat acceptance fee), and over 70% of fresh allocations in late rounds at the non-IITs are rejected by candidates. Since most withdrawals occur just before the deadline, only a small fraction of those seats are successfully filled. (ii)The number of withdrawals is very large (there were 5,525 withdrawals in 2017). Seemingly, candidates are listing programs and accepting seats they don't really want (knowing that they can withdraw later and recover their seat acceptance fee, and face no penalty).
印度工程学院的集中招生
中央资助的印度本科技术学院(cfti)由著名的印度理工学院(iit)以及一些非印度理工学院(国家理工学院、印度信息技术学院等)组成。印度理工学院使用从JEE高级考试中获得的候选人排名进行入学,而非印度理工学院使用一套不同的排名(从JEE主考试中获得)进行入学。直到2014年,印度理工学院和非印度理工学院使用两个不同的程序来分配候选人的席位。每年,几个候选人将获得两个席位,从这些程序中各获得一个席位。因此,这两个席位中至少会有一个空缺。这对印度理工学院来说尤其是个问题,因为他们的分配过程将在非印度理工学院之前完成。2015年,我们为印度80个cfti的500多个项目设计并实施了一个新的本科招生联合(集中)名额分配流程,将印度理工学院和非印度理工学院的流程整合在一起。我们的程序要求每位候选人在所有这些项目中提交一份单独的偏好列表,并为每位候选人最多分配一个席位。我们的流程基于众所周知的延迟接受算法,该算法产生尊重候选排名的公平分配。然而,复杂的平权行动席位预订导致我们进行了许多算法创新,包括(i)一种精心构建的启发式方法,用于合并跨多个项目的非嵌套公共配额,(ii)一种在不修改核心软件的情况下利用未填充的保留席位的方法,以及(iii)一种强大的方法,以减少被录取的保留类别候选人数量的可变性,同时保持公平性。由于考生也有外部选择(例如,参加私人资助的学院,或者在第二年重新参加入学考试),而且由于预计会出现人员流失,我们不允许投机地录取比允许的人数更多的考生,因此我们采取了多轮席位分配程序。在每一轮之后,我们要求候选人在截止日期前支付座位接受费来接受他们分配的座位(如果有的话)。那些没有腾出座位的人,这些座位随后会在未来的轮次中分配给其他候选人。实施多项工艺创新,使多轮流程更加顺畅高效。我们的新座位分配流程于2015年投入使用,并在不断改进中保持了成功的使用。印度理工学院的空缺减少了近70%(例如,2017年10,988个席位中只有198个空缺,而2014年在遗产程序下,9,784个席位中有587个空缺)。与此同时,非印度理工学院的职位空缺只略有减少,这让我们感到担忧,尽管减少这些职位空缺超出了我们最初的任务范围。2017年,开学时,非印度理工学院的25220个席位中有6510个空缺。数据表明,几乎所有这些空缺都是可以避免的,因为有符合条件的候选人想要这些席位。我们对招生数据的分析揭示了非印度理工学院空缺的主要原因:(i)接受座位的考生可以在倒数第二轮之前放弃座位(导致他们的座位接受费退还),并且在非印度理工学院的最后一轮中,超过70%的新分配被考生拒绝。由于大多数提款都发生在截止日期之前,因此只有一小部分席位被成功填满。(二)撤资数量非常大(2017年撤资5525笔)。从表面上看,考生正在列出他们并不真正想要的课程和座位(知道他们可以稍后退出并收回座位接受费,而不会受到处罚)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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