{"title":"Capacity estimation and auditability of network covert channels","authors":"B. Venkatraman, R. Newman","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Classical covert channel analysis has focused on channels available on a single computer: timing channels and storage channels. We characterize network covert channels. Potential network covert channels are exploited by modulating transmission characteristics. We distinguish between spatial covert channels, caused by a variation in the relative volume of communication between nodes in the network, and temporal covert channels caused by a variation in transmission characteristics over time, extending the work of Girling (1987). A model for obtaining a spatially neutral transmission schedule was given by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman (1991, 1992). Temporally neutral transmissions are characterized and scheduling policies to generate temporally neutral transmission schedules were given by Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe (1993). We estimate the covert channel capacity using an adaptive scheduling policy, modeling the system as a mode secure system. Based on our measurements on the University of Florida campus-wide backbone network (UFNET), we discuss the auditability of network covert channels and suggest some handling policies to reduce the capacity of these covert channels to TCSEC acceptable levels.<<ETX>>","PeriodicalId":420458,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"1197 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1995-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"43","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.1995.398932","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
Abstract
Classical covert channel analysis has focused on channels available on a single computer: timing channels and storage channels. We characterize network covert channels. Potential network covert channels are exploited by modulating transmission characteristics. We distinguish between spatial covert channels, caused by a variation in the relative volume of communication between nodes in the network, and temporal covert channels caused by a variation in transmission characteristics over time, extending the work of Girling (1987). A model for obtaining a spatially neutral transmission schedule was given by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman (1991, 1992). Temporally neutral transmissions are characterized and scheduling policies to generate temporally neutral transmission schedules were given by Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe (1993). We estimate the covert channel capacity using an adaptive scheduling policy, modeling the system as a mode secure system. Based on our measurements on the University of Florida campus-wide backbone network (UFNET), we discuss the auditability of network covert channels and suggest some handling policies to reduce the capacity of these covert channels to TCSEC acceptable levels.<>