Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: Raising the Confrontation Requirements for Forensic Evidence in California

Abstract

Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to confront the "witnesses against him."1 However, when considering the admissibility of crime lab reports, the Second and Third Districts of the California Courts of Appeal are interpreting the right to confrontation differently. The disagreement between these courts echoes a larger debate between jurists all over the country, a debate that the U.S. Supreme Court sought to settle with its decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.2 To clarify the application of Melendez-Diaz to California state courts, the California Supreme Court has granted review on People v. Rutterschmidt, a Second District homicide case that raises an issue with crime lab report admissibility.3 This article seeks to predict the outcome of Rutterschmidt by analyzing the language of Melendez-Diaz in relation to the divergent California appellate opinions. In Melendez-Diaz, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a crime lab report identifying a substance as cocaine was a "witness against" the defendant and triggered the defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.4 The decision was the latest in a string of Supreme Court decisions since Crawford v. Washington in 2004 that held that the Confrontation Clause requires the declarants of all "testimonial" statements be cross-examined in