{"title":"An Irregular Architecture of Defence","authors":"Kate Ferguson","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190949624.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When violence began in spring 1992, the Sarajevo government was forced to rely on a loose coalition of irregular armed groups, some of which were created under the auspices of state and pro-government forces, while others were genuine grassroots paramilitary groups. The chapter explains that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged disjointed, at first made up of a network of units organised along roughly conventional military lines and spontaneously created militia formations. The spontaneity of the Bosnian defence came out of necessity rather than design, and meant that irregular armed groups were the foundation of military capabilities. But as the conflict progressed, central authorities were constantly seeking to create a disciplined regular command structure. An irregular, spontaneous, and unified armed coalition meant that the Bosnian government was ill equipped to effectively protect its populations and was hampered in its efforts to convince the international community of their urgent need for protection.","PeriodicalId":333832,"journal":{"name":"Architectures of Violence","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Architectures of Violence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190949624.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
When violence began in spring 1992, the Sarajevo government was forced to rely on a loose coalition of irregular armed groups, some of which were created under the auspices of state and pro-government forces, while others were genuine grassroots paramilitary groups. The chapter explains that the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged disjointed, at first made up of a network of units organised along roughly conventional military lines and spontaneously created militia formations. The spontaneity of the Bosnian defence came out of necessity rather than design, and meant that irregular armed groups were the foundation of military capabilities. But as the conflict progressed, central authorities were constantly seeking to create a disciplined regular command structure. An irregular, spontaneous, and unified armed coalition meant that the Bosnian government was ill equipped to effectively protect its populations and was hampered in its efforts to convince the international community of their urgent need for protection.