Pre-Copernican Stance in Neuroscience and Philosophy: Vantage Point from within Mind or Brain

G. Northoff
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Abstract

Our intuition pulls us towards assuming the mind. We are therefore inclined to approach the question for the existence and reality of mental features in terms of mind and mind-body problem rather than the world-brain problem (even if the latter is more plausible). The present chapter focuses on the origin of our “intuition of mind”. I argue that our “intuition of mind” is closely related to the vantage point or point of view we presuppose – the vantage point determines or frames the possible epistemic options that are included within the “logical space of knowledge”. Specifically, I argue that a “vantage point from within mind” makes possible to include the “intuition of mind” as possible epistemic option in our “logical space of knowledge”. However, such “vantage point from within mind” as well as its various escape strategies including vantage point from within reason and vantage point from brain or body amount to a pre-Copernican stance as they can be compared to the “vantage point from within earth” (chapter 12). My main argument in the present chapter is therefore that, analogous to Copernicus, we need to replace the pre-Copernican “vantage point from within mind” (or from within brain) by a post-Copernican “vantage point from beyond brain” – the latter will be developed in the next chapter.
前哥白尼在神经科学和哲学上的立场:从心灵或大脑的角度来看
我们的直觉把我们拉向假设思维。因此,我们倾向于用心灵和身心问题而不是世界-大脑问题来解决心理特征的存在和现实问题(即使后者更合理)。本章的重点是我们“心灵直觉”的起源。我认为,我们的“心灵直觉”与我们预设的有利位置或观点密切相关——有利位置决定或构建了包括在“知识的逻辑空间”中的可能的认知选项。具体来说,我认为“来自内心的有利位置”使“心灵直觉”成为我们“知识的逻辑空间”中可能的认知选择成为可能。然而,这种“来自内心的有利位置”以及它的各种逃脱策略,包括来自理性的有利位置和来自大脑或身体的有利位置,都相当于哥白尼之前的立场,因为它们可以与“来自地球的有利位置”进行比较(第12章)。因此,我在本章的主要论点是,类似于哥白尼,我们需要用后哥白尼的“超越大脑的优势”来取代前哥白尼的“来自心灵的优势”(或来自大脑的优势)——后者将在下一章中展开。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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