Analysis of Trusted Execution Environment usage in Samsung KNOX

Ahmad Atamli-Reineh, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Ranjbar A. Balisane, Giuseppe Petracca, Andrew P. Martin
{"title":"Analysis of Trusted Execution Environment usage in Samsung KNOX","authors":"Ahmad Atamli-Reineh, Ravishankar Borgaonkar, Ranjbar A. Balisane, Giuseppe Petracca, Andrew P. Martin","doi":"10.1145/3007788.3007795","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Mobile systems have become widely adopted by users to perform sensitive operations ranging from on-line payments for personal use to remote access to enterprise assets. Thus, attacks on mobile devices can cause significant loss to user's personal data as well as to valuable enterprise assets. In order to mitigate risks arising from attacks, various approaches have been proposed including the use of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to isolate and protect the execution of sensitive code from the rest of the system, e.g. applications and other software.However, users remain at risk of exploits via several types of software vulnerabilities - indicating that enterprises have failed to deliver the required protection, despite the use of existing isolation technologies. In this paper, we investigate Samsung KNOX and its usage of TEE as being the current technology providing secure containers. First, we study how KNOX uses TEE and perform analysis on its design consideration from a system vulnerabilities perspective. Second, we analyse and discuss recent attacks on KNOX and how those attacks exploit system vulnerabilities. Finally, we present new shortcomings emerging from our analysis of KNOX architecture. Our research exhibits that system vulnerabilities are the underlying cause of many attacks on systems and it reveals how they affect fundamental design security principles when the full potential of TEE is not exploited.","PeriodicalId":365574,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"15","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3007788.3007795","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15

Abstract

Mobile systems have become widely adopted by users to perform sensitive operations ranging from on-line payments for personal use to remote access to enterprise assets. Thus, attacks on mobile devices can cause significant loss to user's personal data as well as to valuable enterprise assets. In order to mitigate risks arising from attacks, various approaches have been proposed including the use of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to isolate and protect the execution of sensitive code from the rest of the system, e.g. applications and other software.However, users remain at risk of exploits via several types of software vulnerabilities - indicating that enterprises have failed to deliver the required protection, despite the use of existing isolation technologies. In this paper, we investigate Samsung KNOX and its usage of TEE as being the current technology providing secure containers. First, we study how KNOX uses TEE and perform analysis on its design consideration from a system vulnerabilities perspective. Second, we analyse and discuss recent attacks on KNOX and how those attacks exploit system vulnerabilities. Finally, we present new shortcomings emerging from our analysis of KNOX architecture. Our research exhibits that system vulnerabilities are the underlying cause of many attacks on systems and it reveals how they affect fundamental design security principles when the full potential of TEE is not exploited.
三星KNOX可信执行环境使用分析
用户广泛采用移动系统来执行敏感操作,从个人使用的在线支付到远程访问企业资产。因此,对移动设备的攻击不仅会对用户的个人数据造成重大损失,也会对企业的宝贵资产造成重大损失。为了减轻攻击带来的风险,已经提出了各种方法,包括使用可信执行环境(TEE)将敏感代码的执行与系统的其余部分(例如应用程序和其他软件)隔离和保护。然而,用户仍然面临着通过几种类型的软件漏洞被利用的风险——这表明,尽管使用了现有的隔离技术,企业仍未能提供所需的保护。在本文中,我们调查三星KNOX及其使用TEE作为目前提供安全容器的技术。首先,我们研究KNOX如何使用TEE,并从系统漏洞的角度对其设计考虑进行分析。其次,我们分析和讨论最近对KNOX的攻击,以及这些攻击如何利用系统漏洞。最后,我们提出了对KNOX体系结构的分析中出现的新缺点。我们的研究表明,系统漏洞是许多系统攻击的根本原因,它揭示了当TEE的全部潜力未被利用时,它们如何影响基本的设计安全原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信