Plato

T. Irwin
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Plato rejects Socrates’ belief that knowledge of the good is sufficient for being virtuous; he argues that human souls have a non-rational part (emotions, impulses), and that the virtues require not only knowledge, but also the correct training of the non-rational part. He rejects Socrates’ belief that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Instead he argues that the virtuous person is always happier than anyone else. He defends this view in the most difficult case, the other-regarding virtue of justice. Plato recognizes that one may plausibly argue that my justice is good for other people, but harmful to me. None the less he rejects this argument. The appropriate relation between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul promotes both the agent’s good and the good of others; that is why the just person is happier than anyone else. Those who suppose that the just person may be worse off by being just do not understand the character of the human good.
柏拉图反对苏格拉底关于善的知识足以成为有德行的人的信念;他认为,人类的灵魂有非理性的部分(情感、冲动),美德不仅需要知识,还需要对非理性部分的正确训练。他反对苏格拉底关于美德足以带来幸福的信念。相反,他认为有美德的人总是比其他人更快乐。他在最困难的情况下捍卫了这一观点,即关于他者的正义美德。柏拉图认识到,一个人可能会合理地争辩说,我的正义对别人有益,但对我有害。尽管如此,他还是反对这一论点。灵魂的理性部分和非理性部分之间的适当关系既能促进行为人的利益,也能促进他人的利益;这就是为什么公正的人比任何人都快乐。那些认为公正的人可能会因为公正而变得更糟的人,并不理解人类善的本质。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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