Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects of Mandated Employee Benefits

Sharon Rabin-Margalioth
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Whether mandated employee benefit policies are efficient, depends on the ratio of aggregate value attached by employees to the benefit, compared to the aggregate employer cost of providing the benefit. The higher the aggregate value/cost ratio is, the stronger is the justification for implementing the policy. High value/cost ratios are indicative of the existence of market failures in the voluntary provision of the benefit. Mandated benefits, efficient or not, do not entail employer-employee redistributive outcomes. The fact that no employment rate changes can be traced following the enforcement of a mandate program is usually indicative of full employer cost shifting. Policy makers treat the magnitude of cost shifting, as a proxy of the value workers place on the benefit, disregarding the fact that full cost shifting can also result from the inelasticity of labor supply. When inelasticity of labor supply is responsible for full shifting of the costs of the mandate, workers are simply carrying the dead weight cost of the mandate. From an intra-employee perspective, it seems that the public is mainly concerned whether mandates are increasing the unemployment rate. This is true of the minimum wage discourse and the discussions pertaining to the prospects of mandatory employer-provided health insurance. Again, it is assumed that if employment rates are unharmed, the mandate is efficient and equitable since employees are financing the cost of the benefit through decreased wages (health insurance) or increased productivity (minimum wage). The fact that employers do not respond to mandates by decreasing total demand for labor, does not out rule intra-employee redistribution. Mandated benefit schemes, similar to voluntary benefit schemes, reinforce dual labor market practices, in which exempt employees are financing to some extent the costs of providing the benefit to covered employees. This structure of cross-subsidy is efficient from the employer's perspective. It raises productivity and commitment on the part of internal workers. However, it increases compensation disparity between internal and external labor market employees.
强制性员工福利的跨员工再分配效应
强制性雇员福利政策是否有效,取决于雇员所附加的总价值与提供福利的雇主总成本的比率。总价值/成本比率越高,实施该政策的理由就越充分。高价值/成本比率表明在自愿提供福利方面存在市场失灵。强制性福利,无论是否有效,都不会带来雇主与雇员之间再分配的结果。在强制计划实施后,就业率没有变化,这一事实通常表明雇主成本完全转移了。政策制定者将成本转移的幅度视为工人对利益的价值的代表,而忽视了劳动力供应缺乏弹性也可能导致全部成本转移的事实。当劳动力供给的不弹性导致强制医保成本的全部转移时,工人们只是承担了强制医保成本的沉重负担。从员工内部的角度来看,公众似乎主要关心的是强制要求是否会增加失业率。关于最低工资的讨论和有关雇主提供强制性健康保险前景的讨论都是如此。同样,如果就业率不受损害,则假定任务是有效和公平的,因为雇员通过降低工资(健康保险)或提高生产率(最低工资)来为福利的成本提供资金。事实上,雇主不会通过减少对劳动力的总需求来响应命令,但这并不排除员工内部的再分配。强制性福利计划与自愿福利计划类似,加强了双重劳动力市场做法,其中豁免雇员在某种程度上为向受保雇员提供福利的费用提供资金。从雇主的角度来看,这种交叉补贴结构是有效的。它提高了内部员工的生产力和敬业度。然而,它增加了内部和外部劳动力市场员工之间的薪酬差距。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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