Culpable Participation in Fiduciary Breach

Deborah A. DeMott
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This essay makes a case for the salience of tort law to fiduciary law, focusing on actors who culpably participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty, whether by inducing the breach or lending substantial assistance to it. Although the elements of this accessory tort are relatively settled in the United States, how the tort applies to particular categories of actors-most recently investment bankers who serve as M&A advisors-provokes controversy. The paper also explores the less developed terrain of primary actors who breach governance duties that are not fiduciary obligations because the entity's organizational documents eliminate fiduciary duties, as Delaware law permits for LLCs and partnerships. When an accessory actor induces or otherwise assists a primary actor's breach of a non-fiduciary governance obligation, the accessory tort likely to be relevant is wrongful interference with contract. The essay notes parallels and overlaps that connect wrongful interference to culpable participation in a fiduciary's breach. Both are intentional torts for which liability turns on whether an actor in some fashion chose to participate in another actor's breach of duty, as well as whether the secondary actor acted with knowledge of the primary actor's duty and made a causally significant contribution to the breach. Both torts illustrate the foundational significance of duty within tort law: actors subject to liability on accessory theories do not owe duties that replicate those of the primary wrongdoer, who is linked by contract or a fiduciary relationship to the beneficiary. By committing an intentional tort, accessory actors breach duties they themselves owe. Framed within the ambit of tort law more generally, the outcomes in controversial M&A cases do not represent departures from well-established doctrine. These cases do help illustrate what's distinctively wrongful about lending substantial (and knowing) assistance to another actor's breach of duty. The accessory tortfeasors in the essay represent inversions of a well-known set of actors in tort doctrine, rescuers. Rescuers intervene as strangers to a situation in which another is in peril with the objective of preventing harm or mitigating its consequences for the person in peril. Like reflected figures in a warped mirror, the essay's accessory wrongdoers choose to intervene in situations in which one actor owes a duty to another but, if the intervention succeeds, the person to whom the primary was duty is left worse off than had the accessory had not caused the breach of the underlying or primary duty.
参与信义违约的罪责
本文对侵权法对信托法的重要性进行了论证,重点关注那些参与信托人违反义务的行为者,无论是通过诱导违约还是提供实质性帮助。尽管这种附属侵权行为的构成要素在美国已经相对确定,但这种侵权行为如何适用于特定类别的行为者——最近担任并购顾问的投资银行家——引发了争议。本文还探讨了欠发达地区的主要行为者违反治理义务的情况,这些治理义务不是信义义务,因为实体的组织文件消除了信义义务,正如特拉华州法律允许有限责任公司和合伙企业那样。当辅助行为人诱导或以其他方式协助主要行为人违反非信义治理义务时,可能相关的辅助侵权行为是对合同的非法干涉。这篇文章指出了将不法干预与参与受托人违约行为的罪责联系起来的相似之处和重叠之处。这两种侵权行为都属于故意侵权,其责任取决于行为人是否以某种方式选择参与另一行为人的违约行为,以及第二行为人是否在知道第一行为人的义务的情况下行事,并对违约行为做出了因果重大贡献。这两种侵权行为都说明了侵权行为法中义务的基础意义:根据附属理论承担责任的行为人并不负有复制主要违法者的义务,后者通过合同或信义关系与受益人联系在一起。从犯实施故意侵权行为,违反了自己应尽的义务。在更普遍的侵权法范围内,有争议的并购案件的结果并不代表对既定原则的背离。这些案例确实有助于说明,为另一个行为者违反义务提供实质性(和明知的)帮助是明显错误的。本文中的辅助侵权行为人代表了侵权理论中一组著名的行为人——救济者的倒置。救援人员以陌生人的身份介入他人处于危险中的情况,目的是防止伤害或减轻对处于危险中的人的后果。就像一面扭曲的镜子里的倒影一样,文章中的辅助违法者选择在这样的情况下进行干预:一个行为人对另一个行为人负有责任,但是,如果干预成功了,承担主要责任的人的处境会比辅助行为人没有造成对潜在或主要责任的违反时更糟。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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