G. López, Michael Foreman, A. Daftardar, P. Coppock, Zayd Tolaymat, V. Mooney
{"title":"Hardware Root-of-Trust Based Integrity for Shared Library Function Pointers in Embedded Systems","authors":"G. López, Michael Foreman, A. Daftardar, P. Coppock, Zayd Tolaymat, V. Mooney","doi":"10.1109/MECO.2019.8760035","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For resource constrained embedded devices security is often an afterthought during design time. As new applications and devices are developed, they are handling more and more sensitive information. It is imperative to come up with effective solutions that can be supported by these constrained systems. In this work we propose a solution to mitigate shared library function attacks by implementing a hardware root of trust from which to store and retrieve function pointers. We offer two system variations which provide designers with flexibility to choose a lighter or a more robust version. Our work renders GOT overwrite attacks ineffective since it isolates and protects shared library function pointers.","PeriodicalId":141324,"journal":{"name":"2019 8th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 8th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO.2019.8760035","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
For resource constrained embedded devices security is often an afterthought during design time. As new applications and devices are developed, they are handling more and more sensitive information. It is imperative to come up with effective solutions that can be supported by these constrained systems. In this work we propose a solution to mitigate shared library function attacks by implementing a hardware root of trust from which to store and retrieve function pointers. We offer two system variations which provide designers with flexibility to choose a lighter or a more robust version. Our work renders GOT overwrite attacks ineffective since it isolates and protects shared library function pointers.