Managing Two-Echelon Remanufacturing Under Patent Protection

Abstract

Abstract We propose a two-echelon remanufacturing model in the context of two periods in which the factor of patent protection of the original manufacturer is considered. Through the analysis of the Stackelberg game among the supplier, the original manufacturer and the remanufacturer we obtain the equilibrium solutions of the unit patent licensing fee of the original manufacturer, the recycling effort degree of the remanufacturer, the wholesale price of new and remanufactured core components and the retail price of new and remanufactured products in the second period which are all dependent on the retail price of new products in the first period in cases with patent protection and without patent protection. In the numerical study we analyze the impacts of the remanufacturing rate of used products and the retail price of new products in the first period on the equilibrium results of the second period, and make a comparison between the case with patent protection and the case without patent protection.